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ABSTRACT 
An abstract of the thesis of Roger L. Cross for the Master 
of Arts in History presented July 12, 1994. 
Title: Freedom as Self-Legislation: An Examination of 
Rousseau and Kant. 
Rousseau and Kant were philosophers of freedom. Both 
believed freedom was the essence of humanity, and both 
believed that "freedom is self-legislation." This thesis 
examines what they understood to be self-legislation. 
According to Rousseau natural freedom was lost with 
the establishment of society. Society is an "unnatural" 
order and the true basis of society is simply convention. 
Man is free only if he is subject to laws of his own 
making, or at least to those laws to which he has 
consented. The ideal state, according to Rousseau, is the 
republic based on laws that have been created and adopted 
by each members of the community. It is in this sense of 
freedom, for Rousseau, is self-legislation. 
Kant believed the important issue was demonstrating 
the metaphysical possibility of freedom, not the 
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reconstruction of society. Kant argued that freedom could 
be demonstrated, and morality reaffirmed, by focusing on 
the 11 ought" of reason. The 11 ought 11 transcends the physical 
world and was a pure law of reason. It is not subject to 
the physical laws of causality. Man has the ability to act 
according to this law of reason. Man is transcending the 
physical realm, and the physical laws of nature, whenever 
he makes a moral decision based on what he 11 ought 11 to do, 
or whenever he puts duty before his physical desire. This, 
Kant argues, is self-legislation, and only here may man 
hope to be free. 
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CHAPTER 1 
ROUSSEAU ON NATURAL MAN 
INTRODUCTION 
I began this thesis under the influence of Ernst Cassirer. Cassirer, in his 
works on Rousseau and Kant, convinced me that there was a strong and 
direct line of debt owed by Kant to the works of Rousseau. Cassirer's 
interpretation was strengthen by quotes from Kant's letters, and comments 
Kant wrote into the margins of various books he had read. Together they 
supported Cassirer's argument that Rousseau taught Kant to see moral 
philosophy and freedom in a new light. Kant himself declared that just as 
Newton had uncovered the laws of physical nature so Rousseau had 
uncovered the laws of the human heart. Cassirer was able, with this 
evidence, to make strong his argument that Kant's notion of freedom is 
directly indebted to the doctrine found in Rousseau. This thesis is an 
examination of Rousseau's influence on Kant's notion of freedom in light of 
the interpretation offered first by Cassirer. 
But, research could be described as a form of dialogue, and dialogue 
frequently takes on a life of its own. As I reached the final section of my work 
and looked back over what I had set out to show and what I had in fact 
actually shown, I found it increasingly difficult to maintain my original 
premise in its full force. Certainly there are signs of a Rousseauian debt in the 
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work of Kant, and I believe I have uncovered some of them in the course of 
my work, but at the same time I must admit I have backed away from the 
strength of my original convictions. The "debt" seems, now, far smaller than 
it had at first. 
There is, however, a noticeable similarity in form to the solution of the 
question "what is freedom?" in the work of the two men. It is a solution 
which may be briefly stated as "freedom is self-legislation." Freedom is the 
capacity to dictate to oneself standards of behavior. I cannot be forced to obey 
a law someone, or something, has decreed is the law. I may be forced to act 
contrary to my will, but that just means I am not free.I 
If I am free then I am a "law unto myself." But neither man believed 
this self-legislation would justify an attitude of "they did what was right in 
their own eyes." Quite to the contrary, both Rousseau and Kant leave little 
room for individual incentive for all the talk of "self-legislation." Morality 
does not vary from individual to individual in the works of either. One 
important factor in this invariance is that both Rousseau and Kant believe 
morality, and moral choices, are founded upon laws of reason. "Laws of 
reason" are usually considered somewhat static, and if this had been the case 
in Rousseau, then the similarities between the two men would have made 
Cassirer's interpretation almost iron-clad. But it is not the case, and when 
one begins to examine what Rousseau actually meant by "laws of reason" --
and this in turn will lead to an examination of the "nature" of reason, and 
the "nature" of morality--then the rope which a moment ago bound the two 
thinkers so tightly together now appears extremely frayed and tenuous. 
1 With one notable exception--see below, ch. 2, sec. 6. 
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Yet, it is my contention that once the differences are noted and 
acknowledged to be irrefutable we still can find in Kant a bedrock which 
distinctly bears the marks of Rousseau. This is far from saying that Kant 
borrowed from Rousseau his notion of freedom, but I do believe that it is as 
important to note the influence of Rousseau on Kant as it is to note the 
Wolffian, Humean, and Newtonian. In fact, I believe that Rousseau served 
Kant in much the same way that Hume served him. In many ways Rousseau 
was Kant's foil, and much of Kant's work is directed against positions he 
believed held by Rousseau. But in equally important ways Rousseau also 
forced Kant to view the problems and nature of philosophic issues from a 
new perspective. I do not believe it would have been possible for Kant to 
have written the Critiques in the manner he did without this perspective. To 
make the case stronger (though more debatable) I believe that the central 
emphasis of the Critiques on moral and individual freedom reflects both 
Kant's debate against, and his agreement with, Rousseau. I will seek to show 
that Kant took from Rousseau a political notion (that freedom is self-
legislation) and turned it into a metaphysical principle. 
THE TWO NOTIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE WORK OF ROUSSEAU 
Rousseau held two concepts of freedom. One existed, he believed, in 
the state of nature, while the other, at least potentially, exists in the political 
state. Previous readings of Rousseau had elevated the former type of freedom 
to such a high state that it was often believed Rousseau was an advocate of 
the "noble savage." Rousseau was portrayed as a proponent of returning to 
nature, and it was widely believed that he had a disdain for anything which 
restricts our natural freedoms. Such a view can be seen, for example, in the 
""' 
4 
work of Edward Buchner. In an introduction written in 1904 to a collection of 
Kant's lecture notes on education, Buchner notes that, unlike Kant, Rousseau 
"praises barbarity,"2 and seeks to return man to his instinctual self. Rousseau 
was often cast as favoring "instinct" and "passion" over reason. This 
interpretation still may have supporters, but it definitely was undermined by 
the work of scholars in the early part of this century. It was only then, Peter 
Gay notes, that Rousseau was reevaluated by a small group of scholars, 
among whom was Cassirer.3 Perhaps it is too simplistic to see a revival of 
Rousseauian scholarship, but certainly much of the general stereotypes about 
Rousseau and the natural man fell out of favor in the secondary literature. 
Such a quote as Buchner's would be difficult to discover in the Rousseauian 
literature of the past fifty years. 
The view of Rousseau as a proponent of barbarism no doubt stems 
from the reading of his two Discourse. It is unquestionable that Rousseau 
presents pre-social man as far more happy, healthy and even "good" than his 
descendants. The picture he paints is one of idyllic primitivism versus 
decadence. It would be understandable, therefore, to mistake Rousseau's 
intentions and believe he sought a return to the goodness man has lost in 
society. But this was not the case. As I will show, man cannot go back, and 
Rousseau's program, rather than trying to find a way back, will be to try and 
2Edward F. Bucher, Introduction to The Educational Theory of 
Immanuel Kant translated and edited by Edward F. Buchner. (Philadelphia: 
J.B. Lippincott Co., 1904), p. 27 
3Peter Gay, Introduction to The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau by 
Ernst Cassirer, edited and translated with an introduction and a new 
postscript by Peter Gay. 2nd edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 
p.17 
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construct a society in which much of the former happiness of "natural man" 
will be restored to social man. But, even after having noted Rousseau's 
intention, it is possible to still mistake the means Rousseau believed would 
be necessary to construct this happy social order. The mistake would be to 
assume that, since Rousseau obviously holds the natural state in such high 
regard, he will attempt to import the "natural order" into the social. He will 
seek to found his state upon the principles of natural right and law. This 
would be a logical conclusion, but it would be in error. Natural law, 
Rousseau believed, when understood as a moral order which arises from a 
source other than the mind of man, is not a sufficient guide for our actions. 
Furthermore, the man who relies upon nature as a standard of behavior is 
not only foolishly in error, but, again according to Rousseau, he is not free. I 
will eventually show that this rejection of "nature" or "natural law" is central 
to the moral philosophy of both Rousseau and Kant. It is one of their true 
similarities. It is also this rejection of natural law as a standard for self-
legislation which will lead to the conclusion of both men that true morality is 
tied up with the laws of reason, and it is the human ability for self-legislation 
which demonstrates man's freedom. But, before showing how and why they 
reject natural law I must first attempt to clarify what they were objecting to by 
clarifying somewhat the notion of "natural law" in the eighteenth century. 
NATURAL LAW 
The Traditional Views 
Natural law, by the time of Rousseau, was already an overworked 
6 
term. The concept had "seldom been precisely defined,"4 and by the end of 
the eighteenth century this imprecision lent itself to an unfortunate 
ambiguity. We find, in the works of this period, that "almost any outlook" 
could be encompassed in the terminology of "natural law".5 Rousseau is no 
better in this matter than is his contemporaries, and in fact may be worse than 
most. He has been aptly described as "a Janus-like figure in the history of the 
School of Natural Law."6 He typically will use it when it serves his purpose 
to do so, and then renounce it as no standard at all when it no longer seems 
useful? I shall concentrate on his rejection of natural law, for I believe his 
moral theory, and theory of the state, is not built upon the notion of natural 
law, but is in fact a clear and significant rejection of natural law theory. 
The first formation of the "naturalness of justice" comes from the 
Greek stoics. 8 According to Zeno and others the universe is governed by laws 
of reason. "Inanimate things and brutes invariably obey these laws, the first 
out of necessity the second out of instinct."9 Man however is free to obey or 
disobey this law, since he is not subject to instinct. He has the power of free 
4ttenry Vyverberg, Human Nature. Cultural Diversity, and the French 
Enlightenment (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 25 
5J[erome] B. Schneewind, "Kant and Natural Law Ethics." Ethics Vol. 
CIV (Oct., 1993) p. 57 
6Ernst Barker, Introduction to Natural Law and the Theory of Society: 
1500-1800 by Otto Gierke (Boston: Boston Univ. 1957) p. xliv 
7Barker, Introduction to Natural Law and Theory. p. xliv 
8Richard Wollheim, "Natural Law," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
Vol. V (New York: Macmillian Publishing Co. 1967) p. 451 
9wollheim, "Natural Law" p. 451 
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choice. Rousseau's view of natural law bears a resemblance to this stoic 
notion. 
But, the stoics also believed that by looking at the nature of the 
universe, and by examining the rationality of his own mind, man should be 
able to construct a just and moral state. In this sense, the law of "natural" 
reason could be described as a transcendent, static law which serves as the 
ultimate reference for all "human" laws. In some ways this view of the law 
of reason is similar to the conclusion Kant adopted, but it is here, as I will 
show, that there was the greatest disjunction between Rousseau and the 
stoics--and by extension, Kant. 
Natural law grew in significance during the late middle ages, but the 
golden age of natural law was certainly the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries.10 By this time there had been a move away from the "divine" 
elements of natural law which it had acquired during the middle ages. In the 
work of Voltaire, for example, there were two elements to natural law: "its 
fixed, eternal nature and its moral utility."11 When Voltaire spoke of natural 
law he was usually referring to it in a "ethical and normative ... " manner.12 
The law of "transcendent" reason and the law of nature are then in many 
ways synonymous. The great order of the watch-like universe is linked to, 
and discoverable by, the mind of man, according to Diderot, because "natural 
10Barker Introduction to Natural Law and Theory p. xli 
llvyverberg Human Nature p. 25 
12vyverberg Human Nature p. 25 
law is ... based on 'natural reason' and includes 'certain rules of justice and 
equity which natural reason alone has established among all men .... "13 
Rousseau's View: 
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The major objection Rousseau had with both the stoic and the more 
contemporary view of natural law was that they were based on the primacy 
(perhaps 'transcendence' is the better term) of reason. For Rousseau natural 
law "cannot be based, even theoretically, on reason."14 Rousseau rejected all 
previous forms of natural law due to their reliance on some pre-existent and 
transcendent reason supposedly which is found in nature and in men. His 
own reformation of the relationship between natural law and reason was the 
subject of his Second Discourse. 
In this Discourse Rousseau sought to answer the question: "What is 
the origin of inequality among men, and is it authorized by the Natural 
Law?" Rousseau claimed that the question itself was faulty since it made 
natural law a consideration in the discussion of social inequality. Rousseau 
did not believe the two were related. For Rousseau the discussion of natural 
law was only interesting in delimiting natural man's difference from the rest 
of creation--thus it is significant only in a negative sense. It was useful, at 
least in the Second Discourse only in the discussion of the ways man differs 
in essence from animals. 
13vyverberg Human Nature pp. 25-26 
14Roger D. Masters, The Political Philosophy of Rousseau (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1968) p. 81 
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NATURAL FREEDOM 
In the Second Discourse Rousseau stated that man is not like other 
animals because he is not forced to act by instinct in any particular way.15 As 
an example of this he described the cat sitting, and starving, upon a pile of 
fruit. The cat could very well feed itself if it were inclined to do so, but the cat 
is instinctually "hard wired" to such a degree that it is unable to exert enough 
freedom and independence even to save its life.16 Implicit in this is that men 
have the capacity to go against what may be called an 'instinctual hesitancy'. 
A man, faced with a choice between starvation and, say, cannibalism is not 
predictable like the cat. Supposing that the repulsion to cannibalism was 
instinctual and not simply social (Rousseau's view seem to suggest it is the 
latter17), we would still run the risk of loosing money on any bet against a 
man resorting to such measures. Though he may have instinctual drives, 
and about this Rousseau is fairly unclear, man, unlike animals, is not limited 
to those instinctual drives.18 "Nature commands every animal, and beasts 
obey. Man feels the same impetus, but he knows he is free to go along or to 
. t 1119 res1s .... 
15Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality in The 
Basic Political Writings introduction by Peter Gay. (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Co., 1987) p. 44 
16Rousseau, Inequality p. 44 
17 Arthur M.Melzer, The Natural Goodness of Man: On the System of 
Rousseau's Thought (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1990) p. 144 
18Rousseau, Inequality p. 44 
19Rousseau, Inequality p. 45 
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Since an animal "chooses or rejects by instinct"20 it is under natural 
law in the sense of natural law which makes it more similar to the physical 
laws of nature than to a moral law. But man, according to Rousseau, can "by 
an act of freedom" obey or disobey this physical, natural, law.21 Man is, 
therefore, not under natural laws unless he allows his instinctual drives to 
determine his behavior. But in a significant way even the ability to obey 
natural, instinctual, drives is to exercise freedom. Even in a natural state, 
therefore, man is free in the sense that he is not "hardwired" or not simply 
reducible to natural laws of physics like a falling stone. 
What, then, gives rise to this special ability to act freely in the human 
animal which is not present in "machine-like" animals? This question leads 
to a discussion of freedom itself. To understand this lawless form of freedom, 
as opposed to social, lawful freedom, it is necessary to examine more closely 
the essence of man, since it is clear that Rousseau was making this primitive 
freedom dependent on some unique quality within man himself. 
SELF PERFECTION AND NATURAL LAW 
If man is not instinctual like the rest of creation how can he survive? 
Rousseau replaces instinct in man with the rather mysterious capability for 
"self-perfection. "22 It is this faculty which "successively develops all the 
20Rousseau, Inequality p. 45 
21 Rousseau, Inequality p. 44 
22Rousseau, Inequality p. 45 
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others. 1123 It gives man the capability to assume at will actions which are 
instincts in other animals. Thus, he is compensated for his lack of an instinct 
by his ability to learn and modify his actions. He can "observe and imitate" 
and by doing so may approximate to himself the skills which are pure instinct 
in other animals.24 He can alter his behavior. 
This ability to imitate and alter his behavior must be distinguished 
somewhat from the "understanding" for Rousseau accepted an empirical 
definition of the 'understanding.' Thus, he simply made it the reservoir of 
all our ideas and, according to him, ideas are all derived from our 
sensations.25 Thus, as all beasts have sensations, it is a faculty we share with 
all other sensing creatures.26 In this sense at least, man "differs from an 
animal only in degree."27 Yet, he can learn from his mistakes and by 
watching the efforts of other animals.28 Rousseau, then, gave far more 
weight to self-perfection than to the understanding. 
Though self-perfection is not derived from the understanding (or 
"reason" which has not yet developed at this stage) it is somehow wedded to 
this primitive ability, and is the means for man as a species to survive. 
Naturally, a capacity for self-perfection would be of little use in a beast which 
23Rousseau, Inequality p. 45 
24Rousseau, Ineguality p. 40 
25Rousseau, Ineguality p. 45 
26Rousseau, Ineguality p. 45 
27Rousseau, Ineguality p. 45 
28Rousseau, Ineguality p. 45 
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could not form or understand ideas which arise through the senses. But even 
more than a means of simple survival this self-perfecting capability also 
provides the basis for the later development of man's reasoning abilities.29 
The capacity for "self-perfection" is very unclear and seems in 
contradiction with other notions Rousseau had about natural man. As John 
Charvet notes it is hard to see how this "self-perfection" would work if man 
did not first have the ability to compare his actions with that of some other 
creature--but it is exactly this ability to "compare" that Rousseau denies to 
natural man.30 Comparison is in fact not only a product of society, but is the 
root of most of society's ills. 
Another observation about Rousseau's essence of man must be made. 
One which is a key element not only in understanding man in nature, but 
also of understanding the very essence of society and morality as simply 
constructs. Man is by nature, according to Rousseau, a solitary, not a herd, 
animal. In many ways this seems to be the weakest beam of Rousseau's 
philosophical structure, though it is a beam which bares an enormous 
amount of the building's weight. Rousseau seemed to have done little more 
than assume the isolation of man in his primitive state. He did tie this 
argument to the lack of language skills in primitive man, and sought to 
prove by this that it is absurd to suppose that man would, or could, group 
29John W. Chapman, Rousseau--Totalitarian or Liberal (New York: 
Columbia Univ. Press, 1956) p. 6 
30John Charvet, The Social Problem in the Philosophy of Rousseau 
(New York: Cambridge University Press. 1974) p. 30 
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together unless they were under some necessity (like over-crowding).31 Yet, 
nothing removes the possibility that men simply preferred the company of 
their own kind, much as herd animals are drawn together. Cats may hunt 
alone, and dogs in packs, but nothing needs to be assumed about the language 
skills of the one over against the other. This objection to Rousseau's "solitary 
creature" would not be so serious if it were not so central to his 
understanding of primitive, and even social man. 
This objection aside, it is clear that a creature who lives in isolation 
would have absolutely no use or need for laws of justice in the second, 
ethical, sense of natural law. The reason for this is obvious. Without dealing 
with his fellow beings the situation of just or fair actions can never, or at 
most rarely, arise. Add to this the complete lack of personal property in the 
state of nature, no communication abilities but "grunts and moans" and a 
poverty of intelligence all around, and it quickly becomes clear that matters of 
justice, rights and laws simply would not arise. Justice and rights, according 
to Rousseau, can only have meaning in a social situation. Since this was not 
the condition of natural man, we can safely assume he was blissfully ignorant 
of all such moral notions. Rather, "born for himself alone, he has natural 
duties only to himself."32 Thus, not only is man not instinctual, in a physical 
sense, but he is also quite ignorant of the ethical norms Rousseau's 
contemporaries so often attributed to natural man. 
Equally significant is that as a solitary individual man would be 
completely innocent of the notion of authority and obedience. This is a very 
31 Rousseau, Inequality p. 47-50 
32Melzer Natural Goodness p. 128 
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important point because with it Rousseau is able to demolish any suggestion 
that the roles of lord and vassal, ruler and ruled, is somehow based on the 
state of nature, and hence is rational and just. This argument Rousseau 
carried over into his own theoretical constructions of a just society, and he 
used it to demonstrate that "since no man has a natural authority over his 
fellow man ... conventions therefore remain the basis of all legitimate 
authority among men."33 The arguments for the "naturalness" of slavery, 
nobility, kingships and so on simply are false if man was solitary while in the 
state of nature. 
MAN'S NATURAL INSTINCTS AND THE NATURE OF LAW 
Rousseau had sought to undermine the contemporary notions of 
natural law. He rejected the notion that man is physically instinctual, and 
with his ideas about solitary man, he tried to undermine the notion of 
natural law as basis for ethics and social order. Furthermore, if the ethical 
"natural law" is the same as the "law of reason," as so many of his fellow 
writers suggested, then Rousseau, by denying reason's existence before the 
creation of society equally undermines the whole basis of any "natural law" at 
all. What we would find instead is, and this is Rousseau's ultimate 
argument, "social laws." Law would therefore be reduced to convention and 
not to some abstract realm of static reason. This will be Rousseau's 
conclusion. 
33Jean-J acques Rousseau On the Social Contract in Basic Political 
Writings introduction by Peter Gay (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 
1987) p. 144 
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But, are there "instinctual" moral factors in pre-social man? There are, 
according to Rousseau. Rousseau believed that there are "two principles that 
are prior to reason,"34 and hence society. These two drives may loosely be 
considered "moral" for they served as the basis for Rousseau's statement that 
natural man was "good," but this use of the term 'moral' is rather 
unfortunate in just the same sense as is the use of "good" for pre-social 
man.35 There are two instinctual drives, first, an interest "in our well-being 
and our self-preservation" and secondly, "a natural repugnance to seeing any 
sentient being ... perish or suffer."36 It is from these two principles, and not the 
quality of man as a social being, "that all the rules of natural right appear .... to 
flow; rules which reason is later forced to reestablish on other 
foundations .... "37 
Preceding reason is self-love and pity. It will be on the basis of these 
two principles that society should be built if it were to reflect the natural 
order, but Rousseau claimed this has not happened. These two drives are 
buried by man's social order and replaced by love-of-self and pride. These 
natural drives are weak drives when compared to the social drives man's 
reason has taught him. They have a tenuous position as "laws," natural or 
34Rousseau, Inequality p. 35 
35we must resort to the use of these terms simply because of the 
poverty of language to describe the state of man before he invented language, 
which was after he had already entered into society. 
36Rousseau, Inequality p. 35 
37Rousseau, Inequality p. 35 
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otherwise, because they can be disobeyed. Perhaps 'inclinations' would be a 
better term. 
It would be useful, at this point to summarize what can be said about 
natural man since he is to be soon left behind. First, he is capable of self-
improvement. This allied with primitive understanding is sufficient to 
ensure his survival. Second, he is free. He is not subject to natural instincts, 
and thus he is not forced to act in any particular way to the exclusion of 
others. Third, he is a solitary creature who has no notion of justice or morals 
simply because the occasions when such notions would be useful are so rare. 
The conclusions which must be drawn from this is that man is not under any 
natural law, moral or otherwise, and therefore natural law cannot serve as 
the foundation of political, civil, society since natural law does not play a role 
in the essence of man himself. 
THE REJECTION OF NATURAL LAW AS THE BASIS OF SOCIETY 
Rousseau did not out-rightly deny there exists some moral, rational, 
natural law, and in fact he did seem to believe that with enough time the 
wise are able to uncover some kind of natural laws. What this natural law 
would be is not exactly clear, for in a sense Rousseau has already undermined 
the notion of natural law sufficiently to make it irrelevant for his political 
philosophy. But, "instead of flatly rejecting natural law, Rousseau keeps it in 
reserve, so to speak. ... natural law is the guide of a few wise men at the 
margins of society, but it is useless for the many."38 Rousseau may well have 
38Masters Political Philosophy p. 86 
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recognized a transcendent form of morality which he argued "comes from 
God ... but [he continued] if we knew how to receive it from so high, we would 
not need either government or laws."39 In other words, transcendent, 
natural law may exist, but it is of little significance for man. Actually, 
Rousseau seems unwilling, at this point, to accept the conclusions of his own 
system. He accepted some form of "moral" natural law while at the same 
time saying it was completely irrelevant. 
This led Rousseau to adopting what may seem a curious argument. 
Rousseau believed that moral laws must be known to be obeyed, and to be a 
universal law of reason it must speak to all men (at least if it is to be a law of 
behavior). For example, Rousseau wrote that animals, unlike man, are 
"lacking intelligence" not just "liberty," with the result they "they cannot 
recognize law."40 The implication is, on the one hand, that law can only be 
meaningful where intelligence and liberty are present (that is, it must be 
willfully, as opposed to slavishly, obeyed. The subject must recognizes its 
existence and, thus, recognizes its significance). Rousseau affirmed this 
interpretation by writing that in order for natural law to be a law "not only 
must the will of him who is obliged by it be capable of knowing submission to 
it, but also, for it to be natural, it must speak directly by the voice of nature. "41 
Yet, on the other hand, he seemed to be contradicting himself by 
arguing that where these two qualities are present, natural law carries no 
weight and does not serve as a standard for action. That is, natural law is 
39Rousseau, Social Contract p. 160 
40Rousseau, Inequality p. 36 
41Rousseau, Ineguality p. 35 
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quite useless as a basis for society--but it is only in a society that it can be 
known, hence possibly obeyed. But it is clear by examining these passages in 
context that Rousseau is asserting that to be a moral law, and not simply a 
physical law like gravity which is obeyed whether it is known or not, the law 
must be knowable. There is, therefore, a separation between physical and 
normative laws. But what does this do to his earlier suggestion that animals 
obey instinct, hence natural law? We can only assume that he was equating 
instinct with mechanical, physical, laws like gravity etc. This view is also 
supported by his statement that animals are merely "ingenious machines. "42 
Rousseau apparently held that even if a law of behavior was implanted 
into the human heart by God or nature and was mindlessly obeyed, the fact 
that it was "unrecognized" by the subject means that it would not award 
moral credit to the obedient subject. It would be similar to obeying the law of 
gravity. In other words, Rousseau assumed that a subject must have the 
ability to consciously obey or disobey for a decision to be classified as moral. 
This assumption is wholly unremarkable, for we find a similar view in most 
moral theories. It is rational man who has the power to recognize such laws, 
not beasts, so the issue of morality can only occur in the behavior of the 
rational agent. Unfortunately, the capacity for rational actions already 
assumes the formation of society according to Rousseau. This has 
consequences for natural law which will soon be discussed. In the meantime 
we can restate that Rousseau believed natural law served as no standard of 
behavior for man, even though rational man can recognize natural law. The 
"goals" of natural law, then, if they are to have any positive significance at all, 
42Rousseau, Ineguality p. 44 
must be "reestablished on other foundations," such as politics, morals, etc. 
because man has succeeded in "smothering nature," or more exactly, the 
voice of nature.43 The "knowability" of law goes a long way in unraveling 
Rousseau's view of society, politics and morality. The pertinence of this 
position is heightened by examining Rousseau's criticism of his 
contemporaries, to which I shall now turn. 
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In criticizing previous theories which tried to explain the origins of 
society, Rousseau complained that they require that men are enlightened and 
rational before they established their commonwealth.44 In Rousseau's view 
this was nothing short of impossible. He went on to note that: "writers begin 
by seeking the rules on which, for the common utility, it would be 
appropriate for men to agree among themselves: and then they give the 
name natural law to the collection of these rules, with no other proof than 
the good which presumably would result from their universal observance."45 
According to these writers, claimed Rousseau, man must have had insight 
into the nature of organized society before the experience of such a society. 
They must have known what would lead to the common good before they 
were aware of the good and bad society produces. In short, they would "make 
a man a philosopher before making him a man. "46 
43Rousseau, Inequality p. 35 
44Rousseau, Inequality p. 35 
45Rousseau, Inequality p. 35 
46Rousseau, Inequality p. 35 
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FREEDOM AS THE ESSENCE OF MAN 
Rousseau had in mind thinkers like Diderot who had believed that the 
"defining characteristic" of man was his reason.47 Rousseau did not see 
reason as an essential element in man, and thought the species got along very 
well for a long time without it--and were probably happier for it too. Clearly, 
"freedom," not reason, was for Rousseau the essential, defining characteristic 
of man. 
The significance and effect of this natural "freedom" should now be 
examined in full. As noted, freedom detaches the actions of primitive man, 
who is more than an animal machine, from natural law. One ramification of 
this is that social man cannot appeal to natural law as the basis of action, for 
natural law does not stand above man in some natural transcendence, nor 
can it be appealed to as the foundation of a moral theory. Man's free-will 
thus transcends nature, and civic man, as a moral agent, likewise transcends 
all static moral systems (though not political systems). To foreshadow a later 
school of thought, man, as a species at least, is existentially free. 
Thus this original freedom, and the subsequent political freedom, 
cannot be based on natural law since this natural law would precede the 
faculty of reason which, according to Rousseau, must be already developed if 
man is to be subject to natural laws. Man is free in essences because he is not 
subject to physical instincts and because it is nonsensical to talk of his 
obligation to obey moral natural laws before he has developed the capacity to 
reason right from wrong. In addition, morality itself cannot be based on 
natural law, for morality can only arise in a social environment and cannot 
47Masters, Political Philosophy p. 265 
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precede the formation of society. Rousseau would not allow the existence 
even of a natural conscience, for conscience is based on an awareness of 
morality, and that, as noted, can only arise after the establishment of some 
form of society. "A natural law based on the conscience is impossible for man 
in the state of nature because it presupposes the knowledge of good and evil, 
which can only be known [by social man]."48 Society had already been long 
established, according to Rousseau, before humans were sufficiently rational 
to reflect on what is natural law or the best order for a state--and by this time 
it is too late for them to use it to establish the state. 
Rousseau's position may be outlined as follows: natural man is not 
subject to instinct or a transcendent moral order, hence he is by essence free. 
Later in his development humans begins to group together into social bands, 
and from this the social order is born. From society evolves language and 
reason at a fairly late date in the whole history of the species. With the rise of 
reason man can reflect on his surroundings and "uncover" natural laws. But 
by this late stage "natural laws" have little or no real significance, for man is 
no longer "natural" man, but has become socialized. 
Rousseau seems to be countering a view which may also be outlined as 
follows: man is social by nature and this "natural" sociability reflects a natural 
order. Modern man, by reflection, can abstract from this natural order and lay 
bare the correct and proper order of society since it is the same order which is 
found at the heart of primitive society (such as the father-child relationship). 
The universe, after all, is exquisitely ordered, and even the most primitive 
social order reflects the "watchmakers universe." All that needs to be done is 
48Masters, Political Philosophy p. 81 
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to observe the basic relationships displayed by primitive society and from 
them, by modernizing and refining, arrive at the pure foundation of human 
society in its ideal form. This view, as Rousseau has pointed out, assumes 
that natural man was rational, indeed a philosopher, from the very start of 
his existence. By making society such a late development in the history of the 
species Rousseau sought to undermine all "natural" orderings of society, and 
sought to show that society was the most "unnatural" of developments. 
ROUSSEAU ON POLITICAL SOCIETY 
Thus, the long-term significance of Rousseau's rejection of a 
transcendent natural law is that it immediately deflates all arguments which 
justify social and political inequality based upon the "natural order of 
things."49 "Man is born free"SO in the sense that he is subject to no instinctual 
drives, no natural laws--he is born into the realm of the possible. But, 
Rousseau continued, "everywhere he is in chains" as a result of the political 
order he himself, since he is by nature free, has forged. Man is not a moral 
being before the formation of society, which means that there was in 
Rousseau's thinking a unity of the political and moral. For Rousseau 
"Morality is not something externally imposed on men but merely rules they 
freely invent for themselves through consent."51 
Therefore, one result of this "impotence of natural law" and this 
natural freedom was that Rousseau was forced to base virtue and justice on 
49Melzer, Natural Goodness p. 143 
50Rousseau, Social Contract p. 141 
51Melzer, Natural Goodness p. 144 
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political society. "In so doing, Rousseau never denies that there is another 
possible basis of justice; he simply insists that the alternative is impotent."52 
Rousseau, then, saw the basis of society as not natural law, but the "nature of 
law." He may have retained natural law in the greater scheme of things, but 
he explained it as a product of the formation of a political society and not as 
preceding this society.53 That is, he sought to establish political law, and not 
natural law, as the true basis of society. For Rousseau political law was 
dependent on the "collective general will" and not on some transcendent 
morality or order. "The single overriding mission of politics, for Rousseau, is 
to establish the absolute rule of law, to 'put law above man' ."54 Upon the 
heels of politics rides morality, which is itself a product of the political order--
that is, of laws. "Morality is ... merely rules that [men] freely invent for 
themselves through consent. [Rousseau liberated] ... man from all moral 
standards above his own .... "55 It was this discovery, Rousseau claimed, made 
as a result of his experience in Venice and his early studies in the history of 
morality, which led him to the conclusion that "everything is rooted in 
politics and that, whatever might be attempted, no people would ever be 
other than the nature of their government made them."56 
52Masters, Political Philosophy p. 85 
53Masters, Political Philosophy p. 202 
54Melzer, Natural Goodness p. 144 
55Melzer, Natural Goodness p. 144 
56Jean-Jacques Rousseau The Confessions, trans. by J.M. Cohen (New 
York: Penguin Books, 1953) p. 377 
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THE ROLE OF REASON IN HUMAN NATURE 
It is only now that we can turn to the role of reason in Rousseau's 
system. Reason arose from the use of non-instinctual freedom, and while it 
is dependent upon the capacity of self-perfection it is equally dependent upon 
the passions. It is the passions, Rousseau wrote, that perfect our reason.57 
Our desire for pleasure allied with freedom and the capacity of self-perfection 
fuel our quest for more gratification, and the means by which we conceive 
and carry out our plans give birth to the power of reason. Yet, the 
development of reason comes rather late in the development of the species, 
and if it is true that the evolution of language matches the evolution of 
reason, as Rousseau suggested, then it is clear that reason is a product of 
society. Once more society precedes, in at least some sense, a development of 
what some had argued was the basis of both society and natural law. Neither 
natural law or society could be based upon a skill which only develops in the 
confines of society. It would be senseless to speak of a "natural law" if man 
must leave the state of nature to discover such a law. It is even more absurd 
to suggest that society is founded on what was a product of society. 
KANT ON THE ORIGINS OF MAN 
It would be useful at this point to compare, at least cursorily, 
Rousseau's natural man with Kant's. In his work "Conjectual Beginning of 
Human History," Kant also dealt with bestial man, but did so in the 
framework of Genesis. He, like Rousseau, laid aside fact, and seemed to be 
57Rousseau, Inequality p. 46 
suggesting: "let us assume the framework of Genesis and see if we cannot 
offer a rational account of the origins of man." 
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Unlike Rousseau, Kant was willing to give a place to instinct. Early 
man, according to Kant, may have originally survived on the basis of simple 
instinct. Yet, these instincts were not highly developed. Kant envisioned 
man as deciding what to eat on the basis of smell and taste. Sensory instincts 
were, Kant believed, all that need be posited in order to explain the survival 
of the species before the birth of reason.SB Man, according to Kant, is not a 
free creature any more than Rousseau's animal machines. It may then be 
argued that in their evolutionary approach to the origins of man, Rousseau 
and Kant have begun at different stages of development. Rousseau began 
after the ascent of man to humanness, while Kant goes farther back in the 
attempt to explain the original cause of this ascent. I think this view is 
significantly supported by an earlier work in which Kant wrote that " ... man 
was not meant to be guided by instinct or equipped and instructed by innate 
knowledge ... ,"59 and also by a passage in his education theory in which he 
wrote that man "has no instinct, and must arrange the plan of his own 
behavior."60 Furthermore, Kant wrote in the "Conjectural Beginnings," that 
581mmanuel Kant "Conjectural Beginning of Human History" in On 
History, ed. by Lewis White Beck (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc. 1963) p. 
55 
59Immanuel Kant "Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan 
Point of View" in On History, ed. by Lewis White Beck (New York: Bobbs-
Merrill Co., Inc. 1963) p. 43 
60Immanuel Kant The Educational Theory of Immanuel Kant, 
translated and edited by Edward F. Buchner. (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co., 
1904), p. 102 
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nature so sparsely equips man with the "basic animal equipment" that it does 
little more than meet the "most pressing needs of the beginnings of 
existence."61 Nature's 'intent', if such a word may be used, is to throw man 
onto the reliance of his reason and, as we shall see, freedom. There is 
therefore no necessary contradiction between Rousseau and Kant on the issue 
of instincts. 
The true origin of humanness for Kant began with what in theology 
may be called the 'original sin'. The tempter in this case, however, is no 
serpent, but the first stirrings of reason. Reason suggested to this brute some 
activity which goes beyond mere instinctual desire. Perhaps it saw a fruit 
which it was unaccustomed to eating. Reason created an "artificial desire" 
which is "contrary" to instinct. Man, in the moment of true inception as 
man, transcends his natural desires: he does "violence to the voice of 
nature .... "62 Thus, the overcoming of the natural order (which in Kant is 
termed 'freedom') was for Kant, as for Rousseau, the hallmark and essence of 
the truly human. Once man has trampled upon natural inclination he leaves 
the natural order and becomes wholly other. Unlike animals he is not 
limited to a "single way" of life, but has discovered that there is an "infinity" 
of possibilities which now faces him. Man has learned by this one act that he 
can extend himself "beyond the limits to which all animals are confined. "63 
He is no longer a member of the natural realm, but now a transcendent being. 
The frightful consequence is that having forced his way free he can no longer 
61 Kant, "Universal History" p. 43 
62Kant, "Conjectural Beginning" p. 56 
63Kant, "Conjectural Beginning" p. 56 
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return to the blissful ignorance of the beast, for man has peered into the abyss 
of limitless possibility.64 He has discovered freedom. 
Once man has discovered his freedom all natural desires may be 
subjected to the eye of reason. Man no longer must act in any particular way. 
Rather, impulses can now be pursued or resisted according to the will. It is in 
the resistance of natural impulses and the concern for curtailing the natural 
impulse in others (which may arise through the senses--hence the fig-leaf)65 
which gives birth to the first principles of morality.66 
What has been established so far is that both Kant and Rousseau 
defined the essence of natural man in the same way--it was freedom from 
instinct and the natural order. For Kant reason and freedom were 
synonymous. Freedom is the realization of other possible actions which are 
not suggested by instinct or natural law. Kant made this distinction between 
freedom and instinct, or natural physical desires, most clear in his Critiques of 
Pure and Practical Reason. The distinction between the two realms, the 
rational versus the physical was the central tenet of the whole critical 
structure, and served as the cause for his division of man into phenomenal 
and noumenal. He used this division to defend the absolute law of physical, 
mechanical, causality in nature--which for animals includes purely 
instinctual behavior--while yet maintaining that man is intellectually, and 
thus morally, a free agent. 
64Kant, "Conjectural Beginning" p. 56 
65Kant, "Conjectural Beginning" p. 57 
66Kant, "Conjectural Beginning" p. 57 
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Rousseau did not make this "metaphysical" distinction and we need 
not look for it in his works, but the acceptance of freedom as basic to the 
essence of man was central to his work. This must be understood before one 
can safely pass on to his criticism of modern society and also how society 
should actually be constructed. That is, it was a doctrine central not just to the 
Discourses, but also to the Social Contract and the Emile as well. 
CONCLUSION 
In the rise of the brute creature to the "human" we see that the major 
area of difference between Rousseau and Kant was the role they ascribed to 
reason. Kant obviously returned to the view of Rousseau's contemporaries 
and accepted the centrality of reason in the development of men. However, 
we do not see in his work the notion that the natural, instinctual, state is the 
state of reason. Rather, reason is born at the moment of man's rejection of 
the natural order. Natural law is not viewed by either man as defining the 
essence of the human race. 
CHAPTER2 
ROUSSEAU ON THE FOUNDATION OF SOCIETY 
INTRODUCTION 
"Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains." Perhaps it would 
be better to recast this quote as "Mankind was born in natural freedom., but 
now he is in social chains." Admittedly the original is more pithy, but in 
some way this better expresses the true intent of Rousseau's view of both 
freedom. and society. In this chapter I will explore Rousseau's views of both. 
Natural freedom., according to Rousseau, was lost when man entered 
society. At that moment he lost the advantages of the primitive golden age 
and reaped only the baneful fruit of social inequality. But it need not have 
been this way. Society, in and of itself, need not be an evil. We can view the 
works after the Second Discourse as an attempt by Rousseau to fix the 
boundaries of a society which would have all the advantages modern society 
has to offer without its vices. But, it is still not clear what kind of free society 
Rousseau envisions, for social man's freedom. is not synonymous with the 
natural freedom. of the forest. That freedom. was lost irrevocably when man 
began to claim. property. At that time began all the wants and desires which 
enslave man and make him. so unhappy. It will be necessary to examine 
what Rousseau means by "free" in a social context com.pared to "free" in a 
state of nature. The one must never be confused with the other. 
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In the previous chapter it was noted that man in the state of nature was 
happy and free. Man was not a fallen creature, but naturally "good" (or at 
least amoral) and therefore did not need to be saved from his neighbors by the 
creation of a paternalistic society. Rather, man wandered about isolated and 
unconcerned with his fellow men. Man had no room for unhappiness 
simply because such an emotional state involves the ability of comparison. 
Such a feat of reasoning cannot arise among isolated creatures with little if 
any reasoning capabilities. It is no doubt the development of this faculty--and 
the misery and dissatisfaction which stems from it--which led Rousseau to 
declare that reflection was depravity.67 Natural man was not burdened by 
reason. 
Man somehow fell from this happy state into his present state of 
inequality and unhappiness. Though things were created good, "man 
meddles with them and they become evil."68 While it will not be in our 
interest to trace the fall "out of" the natural state, it must be noted that 
Rousseau does not believe that we, having lost our 'naturalness,' can ever go 
back. He writes: " ... human nature does not go backward, and it is never 
possible to return to the times of innocence and equality once they have been 
left behind. "69 We can only go forward. Man must learn to build states 
67Rousseau, Ineguality p. 42 
68Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile (New York: Dutton 1969) p. 5 
69Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, Rousseau Judge of Jean-Jacques: Dialogues in 
The Collected Writings of Rousseau Vol.l, trans. Judith Bush, C. Kelly, and 
Roger Masters. (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1990) p. 213 
which, though not modeled on nature, will yet restore some of the lost 
equality of our natural state. Man must reshape society and himself. 
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But, what kind of society shall it be? Natural law as we saw serves as 
no standard and must be disregarded when seeking the proper design of a 
society. In fact Rousseau suggests that the attempt to use it in civil society 
means following a "false guide" and would be positively harmful.70 What 
then shall serve as a guideline and foundation for justice and social equality? 
This question introduces us to the primary reason Rousseau rejected natural 
law as a model for the state. To understand why he felt it essential to deny 
the political authority of natural law will bring greater understanding of his 
political theory. 
The question then is: "once we acknowledge we cannot appeal to 
'natural law' as a moral ideal, what is to serve as the basis of politics and 
justice?" It is this question Rousseau turns to in the works which follow the 
two Discourses. A careful reading reveals, however, that his answer is 
already foreshadowed in the Second Discourse. In fact, Rousseau claims that 
his position was not something he worked out over time, but was the 
conclusion he arrived at while working for the French embassy in Venice. It 
was in this period, he writes, that he discovered "everything is rooted in 
politics and that, whatever might be attempted, no people would ever be 
other than the nature of their government made them."71 
70Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on Political Economy in The Basic 
Political Writings trans by D.A. Cress. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Co.,1987) p. 113 
71 Rousseau, Confessions p. 377 
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This principle is both revolutionary in implication and serves as a key 
to the whole of Rousseau's philosophic system. When it is kept in mind, 
what often seems contradictory in Rousseau resolves itself. Rousseau really 
is, as he himself claimed, the most consistent of philosophers, at least in 
regard to this political thesis. 
The quickest and surest method of immersing ourselves into this view 
is by trying to reconcile two of his works which, when viewed together, have 
always daunted his interpreters. If Rousseau is, as he claimed, consistent then 
we should be able to resolve what is often viewed as a 'disunity' (or 
something worse) into an unity. This 'disunity' arises when the critic tries to 
compare The Social Contract and The Government of Poland. 
THE GOVERNMENT OF POLAND 
Difficulties Involved in Interpreting this Work 
Willmoore Kendall in his introductory essay "How to read Rousseau's 
Government of Poland" describes the difficulty of reconciling the work on 
Poland to the bulk of Rousseau's other work. Frequently the critics do no 
better than simply to ignore Poland. Thus, Roger Masters in his otherwise 
excellent work The Political Philosophy of Rousseau (1968) only mentioned 
Poland in passing. The oddness of this neglect becomes apparent when one 
considers that here we have one of the very few works Rousseau wrote which 
were actually directed to a real situation and a real problem. The author of 
the Social Contract is here describing the reformation of a real state. Where 
better, it would seem, to examine the validity of our understanding of his 
political theory than in a work which he intended to be put into practice? Yet 
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Poland is hardly ever discussed. It is also a burr in the skin of the critic who 
would read into the theoretical works revolutionary doctrines of democracy 
or liberalism. Likewise, we must pity the poor reader who first approaches 
Rousseau by way of Poland, for they will no doubt never understand most of 
the current scholarship on Rousseau or be able to shake off the impression of 
Rousseau's conservatism and respect for the status quo. 
We must join Kendall by asking with him how this work should be 
read. Kendall describes various ways to read Poland, but ultimately he settles 
on the idea that it is a "venture in 'secret writing'."72 Rousseau really does 
not intend this work for the actual state of Poland which so shortly will be 
divided up among its neighbors. Rather this is a work designed "for the 
territorially extensive modern nation-state as such ... " and it is Rousseau's 
intent, not to prescribe to Poland, but to make a work which would serve as a 
guidebook for "his future adepts .... "73 In other words Rousseau is aware that 
Poland is a lost cause and is writing for future generations. Only in the future 
will his true greatness be discovered and they will turn to him for 
instructions on the creation of modern nation-states. 
It seems this explanation of Poland is dubious. It certainly is true that 
Rousseau kept one eye focused upon a future that he believed would finally 
vindicate him before his enemies, but the notion of a secret doctrine just 
seems too unlikely and clandestine. Furthermore, secret doctrines are 
extremely malleable to the interpreter's bias, and are hard either to prove or 
72wmmoore Kendall "Introduction" to The Government of Poland by 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Trans. and intro by Willmoore Kendall (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing Co. 1987) p. xxvii 
73Kendall, Introduction to Poland. p. xviii 
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disprove. Gnosticism may be clear to the initiated, but its doctrines must 
remain a mystery to outsiders. The same is true for the reader of Rousseau if, 
in fact. there is some hidden doctrine behind the words of this work. 
What then is the alternative? How can we possibly reconcile, as 
Kendall notes, statements about legitimate government being dependent 
upon the "general will" of every individual and the suggestions in Poland 
that the serfs not be freed?74 How do we steer a course between the 
revolutionary implications of the Social Contract and the monarchical, rather 
conservative details found in Poland? Did Rousseau change his mind? Was 
he attempting to win over the Polish nobility's support for greater reforms by 
conceding to them the points he realized could not be changed anyway 
(which would make Rousseau rather the pragmatist)?75 Or do we really have 
here some "secret doctrine" which for our purposes renders this work rather 
spurious? None of these options is attractive. What is left is to shave the 
problem with Occum's razor and take at face value Rousseau's claim that he 
was always making the same point throughout all his works. Perhaps the 
dilemma is not that we do not correctly understand the Poland. Perhaps the 
problem is that we do not understand either it or the Social Contract, because 
we do not know what Rousseau means when he writes that "everything is 
rooted in politics ... " or when he writes that the "social order ... serves as a 
foundation for all other rights. Nevertheless, this right does not come from 
nature. It is therefore founded upon convention.''76 To understand both the 
74Kendall, Introduction to Poland. p. xiv 
75Kendall, Introduction to Poland. p. xvi-xvii 
76Rousseau, Social Contract p. 141 
Poland and the Social Contract we must first examine the consequences of 
these claims. This once more returns us to the examination of the roots of 
society. 
ROUSSEAU'S VIEW ON THE FOUNDATION OF SOCIETY 
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The importance of what Rousseau was really saying about nature only 
becomes apparent when the discussion moves from the "historical" 
perspective of the two Discourses to the prescriptive found in such works as 
the Poland. Whether or not natural man was ruled by the laws of nature and 
whether he was thus more moral or immoral than modern man is 
interesting and significant, but what would prove far more significant, and 
perhaps even dangerously revolutionary, would be the denial of any standard 
upon which the current political structures of men are built. This would 
suggest "anything goes" and seems likely to result in a free-for-all. This is, it 
will be shown, an accurate reflection of Rousseau's views of modern society. 
A doctrine that there is no external standard upon which a political 
philosophy could be based would remove any restraint on the "possible." 
The powerful could, with impunity, exploit the ruled as they please without 
the fear of violating some moral standards of God or man. But, on the other 
hand, all claims of legitimacy would equally be cast aside. In its place we 
would find a "top-dog" notion of force. The ruler's place is assured only as 
long as strength maintains him, but he can be justly toppled at any moment 
with no fear of stepping upon some "divine rights." In such an amoral 
political system Rousseau claimed that: "as soon as one can disobey with 
impunity, one can do so legitimately .... "77 
36 
This state of affairs, according to Rousseau, cannot be counted as a 
"social order." Rather we simply see the state of nature writ large. First, as he 
notes, "force is a physical power" and so it is impossible "to see what morality 
can result from its effects."78 Rousseau then goes on to ask "what kind of 
right is it that perishes when the force on which it is based ceases?" 
Obviously force is not the basis for morality since it insures no rights nor, 
significantly, duties. "If one must obey because of force, one need not do so 
out of duty ... this word 'right' adds nothing to force."79 "Duty" is central to 
Rousseau's notion of morality, and his philosophy must be viewed in this 
light. 
A system based on force lacks moral justification. Force cannot be the 
basis of any political system. Force is "lawlessness," i.e., it is a return to the 
state of nature: "no sooner does a man claim, independently of the laws, to 
subject another to his private will, than he at once leaves the civil state, and 
in relation to the other man, places himself in the pure state of nature .... "80 
By extension any ruler not in place by some common consent of the ruled has 
placed himself in a state of nature towards them. He is nothing more than a 
brigand. 
77Rousseau, Social Contract p. 141 
78Rousseau, Social Contract p. 143 
79Rousseau, Social Contract p. 143 
80Rousseau, Political Economy p. 117 
37 
The fact that Rousseau viewed almost all of modern society in this 
light cannot be ignored without casting all of his political philosophy into 
confusion. Having denied the prescriptive powers of natural law and 
excepting the theoretical social contract of republics, all modern states are 
founded on no more of a legitimate basis than force. The fact that these 
illegitimate states claim for themselves legitimacy, and a legitimacy which is 
believed and accepted by their subjects, is, Rousseau believed, the result of the 
greatest deception in the history of humanity. This was, in a way, the "fall" 
which is every bit as destructive as the fall in the Genesis account. The rich 
completely deceived the poor into exchanging their freedom for slavery in 
the name of "common defense."81 That, Rousseau tells us, is the true basis of 
modern society and that deception is the true "legitimacy" of its rulers. 
Society is based on force and inequality. 
This "law" of force still functions and causes never-ending strife and 
contention. The only real alternative, Rousseau believed, to this social 
division and envy is a harmony based on "convention"--i.e., the acceptance 
by all of a set of laws and mores. 
Rousseau writes: "Since no man has a natural authority over his 
fellow man, and since force does not give rise to any right, conventions 
therefore remain the basis of all legitimate authority among men."82 He 
removes the appeal to nature or force to justify an act morally. Morality is the 
result of convention and consent and is therefore inevitably linked to the 
political existence of man. 
81 Rousseau, Ineguality p. 69 
82Rousseau, Social Contract p. 144 
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Logically one can argue that the unrestricted use of force for one's own 
good, while not morally justified, is not immoral either--a priori. Rather the 
inequality of force and the use of one's force for the attaining of one's own 
good is simply man in a state of nature. The reliance on individual force is 
not the means of establishing a civil state, but outside such a state "morality" 
is not at issue. This is central to an understanding of Rousseau's views of 
both politics and the nature of man. In society it is not arbitrary power which 
stands supreme, it is law. In nature it is simply force. 
Obviously then, the reason that "might" does not make right is that 
man no longer is in a state of nature. The loss of natural freedom which 
enslaved man may also be the best means of providing him a new basis of 
freedom. It is, admittedly, an unnatural freedom being both political and 
institutional, but it is the institutions and laws of man which keep him from 
the horrible consequences of force latent in his own nature. 
This can perhaps be best illustrated in the following manner. It would 
be possible to herd a large number of solitary, wild, animals suddenly into a 
confined area. The results would be catastrophic if the beasts were naturally 
territorial, as solitary species tend to be, and thus antagonistic to others of 
their own kind. Suddenly they are surrounded and have no means of escape. 
It is possible that not even natural "pity" could prevent bloody encounters. It 
certainly would not occur to these solitary animals to suddenly set up a social 
hierarchy to prevent innumerable battles over mates, available food, or 
territory. Yet this is exactly what happened in the history of man. 
The social implication of Rousseauian "self-love" really is a form of 
"might makes right." This doctrine is harmless as long as each individual 
has room to flee from others of its kind, but could be devastating for a species 
if they were deprived of the option of fleeing and were forced to remain in 
close proximity to others of their kind. 
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Natural freedom is lost with the formation of society. Now all man 
has left is the freedom provided by the social and political institutions which 
entwine him. But for Rousseau the chains which bind man are also the very 
ones which can serve, if rationally used, as the means to a wider form of 
freedom and survival than he can otherwise experience. There is a flavor 
about this of Hobbes. To clarify Rousseau's position of the state it would be 
helpful to compare him more directly with Hobbes. 
ROUSSEAU'S VIEW OF HOBBES 
From the above it should come as no surprise that there are numerous 
similarities between the two since Rousseau himself praised Hobbes's 
political understanding. According to Rousseau, Hobbes, "of all Christian 
authors," is the only one to grasp the true nature of politics and its 
dilemmas.83 Rousseau's praise reveals an undercurrent of his own political 
philosophy, his praise is for Hobbes' understanding, and attempted 
resolution, of the issue of religious versus political authority. It would be 
informative to map out that point Rousseau found so praiseworthy in 
Hobbes. 
According to Rousseau western civilization has suffered from divided 
loyalties. Men have not just their lords set over them, but clerics as well. The 
result, from the days of Jesus, has been "infernal division that never ceased to 
agitate Christian peoples." All this because Jesus attempted to separate "the 
83Rousseau, Social Contract p. 222 
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theological system from the political system".84 The tension caused by this 
division has been a disease at the heart of the Christian west ever since. No 
one is sure to whom he owes supreme loyalty, the lord or the cleric.85 
Rousseau believed division in a society was one of the worst problems 
a society could face. He praised Mohammed for his "sound opinions" in 
uniting political and religious authority under one head and notes that as 
long as the two were held by one man the government was good.86 It was 
only with the conquest by barbarians that the two became separated--leading 
to all manner of corruption and ill-governance. But Hobbes understood the 
need to unite the "two heads of the eagle," Rousseau claimed, and had tried 
to effect a "complete restoration of political unity, without which no state or 
government will ever be well constituted. "87 
Ultimately Rousseau thought Hobbes failed to provide a viable 
solution to the problem of divided authority. He failed because he 
underestimated the power and interests of the priests. Christianity, Rousseau 
writes, will "always be stronger than that of the state" in Hobbes's political 
system88. Rousseau believed that in a real social order there simply cannot be 
any division among the people for "whatever breaks up social unity is 
worthless. All institutions that place man in contradiction with himself are 
84Rousseau, Social Contract p. 221 
85Rousseau, Social Contract p. 141 
86Rousseau, Social Contract p. 141 
87Rousseau, Social Contract p. 141 
88Rousseau, Social Contract p. 223 
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of no value. "89 Both religion and political authority must be unified under 
one head, and that head will be the political. 
This gives to Rousseau's work an element of authoritarianism which 
ought not be overlooked. Rousseau clearly did not object to Hobbesian 
authoritarianism. He did not criticize Hobbes for giving the political realm 
too much power--in fact his major concern was that Hobbes made the 
political arm too weak. According to Rousseau, Hobbes does not manage to 
fully encompass religion in politics and thus leaves too much room for the 
clerics exerting their own authority and thus dividing the state. Rousseau 
would have Hobbes and all political philosophers realize that religion must 
be a department of the state and that they must give up all notions of creating 
a "Christian Republic." These terms are mutually exclusive.90 
Still, Rousseau did credit Hobbes with seeing the problem of divided 
loyalties of religion and politics in western society, and Rousseau admired 
him for this insight. But Hobbes, according to Rousseau, failed to grasp the 
correct solution to the problem. According to Arthur Melzer, contrary to 
general opinion Hobbes did not just believe humans were too self-willed by 
nature and always at war with one another. Hobbes also saw that humans are 
far too obedient to authorities. They are too easily led.91 The real danger to 
society is not that each man wars against his neighbor, but that they quickly 
fall into line behind "rabble-rousers" who seek to overturn the established 
89Rousseau, Social Contract p. 223 
90Rousseau, Social Contract p. 225 
91 Melzer, Natural Goodness p. 121 
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authority and put themselves at the head of society.92 Hobbes believed it was 
his task to design a political philosophy which would simplify and establish 
once and for all the lines of authority and thus guarantee undivided 
obedience. In an ideal state the usurper would clearly be in the wrong and 
would not gamer wide support. Society, with its clear and clean lines of 
authority, would have internal peace and unity. This is the problem Hobbes 
set out to address and the resemblance to Rousseau is clear. Nor should we 
ignore the methods Hobbes used to reach his goal and how similar they are to 
Rousseau's methods. It is interesting that before he tried to prescribe the 
shape of the correct state, Hobbes first undermined the traditional lines and 
avenues of authority. Rousseau does the same as he seeks to deny the 
authority of natural law and treats traditional avenues of legitimacy as simple 
power relations. After undermining the alternatives Hobbes employed the 
notion of a "social contract" and claimed this is the only sure footing upon 
which authority may stand. More specifically Hobbes believed that the "state 
of nature" where all warred with all "refutes all claims to leadership and 
throws each man back on himself."93 Thus, as Rousseau later, Hobbes 
asserted that men coming out of a state of nature are all equal in a political 
sense. This is so since all are "politically" equal in a state of nature. It may be 
true that physical inequalities may allow one individual to defeat another, 
but this does not justify "kings" in a modern society. The two are unrelated. 
True authority then is based upon a "social contract" among free and 
92Melzer, Natural Goodness p. 121 
93Melzer, Natural Goodness p. 122 
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equal individuals.94 It is irrelevant to Hobbes who is chosen to rule--or even 
what family or dynasty is chosen--what is of importance is that once the 
choice is made there cannot be any challenge to the ruler. Any challenge of 
the king's authority would be rebellion against the whole, since they made 
the original contract. There cannot exist multiple authorities, for once one is 
selected to rule he bears the right to all the power of the state. There is no 
disunity and people will be free to follow their natural inclinations by 
following the legitimate ruler. The greatest evil for Hobbes and Rousseau is 
not the arbitrary use of power, but social division. 
This was an "ideological revolution" according to Melzer. For the first 
time in western political theory the idea of authority is detached from any 
claims about a natural moral superiority, or divine right. Hobbes had created 
a system where "political legitimacy ... stands independent of any moral or 
religious claims .... "95 It is precisely on this point and the method used that 
Rousseau agrees and imitates Hobbes. As Melzer writes, it should be no 
surprise that both "share an identical view of the central political task ... : both 
are obsessed with closing off every possible challenge to the law, both seek an 
airtight state with an 'infallible' absolute sovereign .... "96 Furthermore, both 
see the greatest danger to the state to be contested authority, especially from 
those who claim as the foundation of their authority a "higher law."97 Both 
94Melzer, Natural Goodness p. 123 
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seek to head off all such claims by strengthening the state and "subverting all 
traditional sources of authority .... "98 Unlike Hobbes, Rousseau found the best 
guarantor of unity in the state to be strict laws and mores. But both make the 
people at least the initial "sovereign" who establish either the ruler (Hobbes) 
or rules of the state (Rousseau). Rousseau, as we see, bears a significant 
resemblance to Hobbes. The resemblance is far greater than that which he 
shared with his enlightened contemporaries. What is noticeably and 
centrally different about the two men is Rousseau's dependence on the 
authority of laws rather than rulers. It is this solution of the problem which 
Hobbes failed to grasp. 
LAWS AND CUSTOMS AS THE ONLY VALID SOCIETAL BASIS 
Rousseau never equivocates about these points: laws and customs are 
the true basis of morality, and a rule of law is the only valid basis for a society. 
The spring from which all legitimate laws flow is the general will. The laws 
in and of themselves are pure convention, and in fact it is this that Rousseau 
believes gives them their validity. Any other source would be to impose 
upon man from the outside, and this would deny man's freedom and at the 
same time call into question man's need to obey. Man has no duty to obey 
sheer force, but he cannot fail to have a duty to laws he himself has freely 
consented to, and empowered. It is in willingly binding ourselves by law that 
we rediscover freedom. This is the central tenet of Rousseau's philosophy. It 
was the tenet that was missed by his contemporaries and subsequent 
generations who read into his work a return to the barbarous state of nature. 
98Melzer, Natural Goodness p. 125 
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This definition of freedom as self-legislation may seem rather counter-
intuitive, and Rousseau obviously recognized this, for he himself rhetorically 
asks how everyone can be bound by laws yet free. He answers that under law 
men are actually "free because, under what appears to be subjection, no one 
loses any of his liberty except what can be harmful to the liberty" of others. 
And, "it is to law alone that men owe justice and liberty."99 
It is only with a state formed on the rule of law, Rousseau believed, 
that we can avoid the division of authority so prevalent in western history 
and also avoid the despotism which is a necessary outcome of unjust 
governments based on principles other than the general will. He believed 
that free men exercising free reason will inevitable arrive at the best method 
for obtaining the common good.100 The only way that the common good 
cannot be upheld in such a free state is if there begins to develop factions and 
parties within the state. This will split, once more, a man's loyalties and 
prevent the necessary free use of reason in the interest of party spirits. 
"Political obedience can only be legitimate if it can be explained as a construct 
of reason, and such mental constructs ... must take as given ... that each 
individual has his own will.. .. "101 Each individual must be free to will for 
the common good what he thinks best. Rousseau believes that this will 
result in the actual best, for each individual will be willing to put aside his 
99Rousseau, Political Economy p. 117 
100Ernst Cassirer, The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau edited and 
translated with an introduction and a new postscript by Peter Gay. 2nd edition 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), p. 97 
101 Masters, Political Philosophy p. 285 
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own "best" for the good of all if he is convinced that all will do the same. No 
one individual profits inordinately while the rest suffer (despotism).102 
Furthermore the man under the rule of law is truly and uniquely free 
for "under law, each obeys and no one commands ... all are equal under it."103 
All the inequality of other theories and practices are avoided since there is 
none who stands above or apart from the law. Despotism is ruled out and 
social division is likewise avoided since the general will battles with no other 
power for priority. There is no possibility to challenge the general will apart 
from pure rebellion. There is no other means of establishing a basis for 
power than the free will of all. 
What could possibly be countered to such a power basis? Certainly not 
natural law, as this has little or no relevance to society; in fact it is counter to 
the very establishment of a society, as Rousseau has shown. In fact he wrote 
that the magistrate who listens to the voice of nature is relying upon a "false 
guide" which "divert[s] him from his duties" and ultimately leads to his or 
the states downfall.104 The law of God, while not specifically addressed, 
serves as no more of a basis for challenging the will of the many. We may 
infer this from the role Rousseau gives to religion in the state. 
As noted before, religion becomes little more than a department of the 
state. It is not outside the realm of the state and thus cannot be outside the 
domain of the general will. It cannot serve, in this role, as the basis of a 
102Rousseau, Social Contract p. 148 
103Lester G.Crocker, Rousseau's Social Contract: An Interpretive Essay 
(Cleveland: The Press of Case Western Reserve Univ., 1968) p. 12 
104Rousseau, Political Economy p .113 
challenge to the state, rather its sole occupation is service to the state. 
Rousseau even goes as far as to suggest that the general will is in fact the 
"voice of God."lOS 
47 
Thus the rule of law is an outgrowth of the general will and that alone. 
It is little more than the voice of the general will. It is for this reason 
Rousseau distinguished between a government and the sovereign. It is the 
sovereign which is synonymous with the general will, or what Rousseau calls 
the "body politic."106 This body politic is, according to Rousseau, "a moral 
being which possesses a will; and this general will, which always tends 
towards the conservation and well-being of the whole and of each part .. .is the 
source of the laws .... "107 It is, by this definition, impossible for any law, 
accepted by the body politic, to be anything other than lawful, moral and just 
for this would suggest that something "prescribed by law could fail to be 
lawful."108 Thus, there is no possibility to label Spartan boys 'thieves' when 
they stole for their dinners. This act was dictated by their customs, the general 
will, and was therefore fully lawful and moral in that society. Therefore the 
"laws" of the general will are all 'just' since for Rousseau by definition there 
is no other notion of 'just' than the self-imposed rules (laws and mores) of 
the collective. Rousseau has effectively removed all other, external, means of 
judging the "just" than this notion of self-imposed convention and in his 
105Rousseau, Political Economy p. 115 
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political theory "law is prior to justice."109 
There is no division: there is no despotism. Man is free in a sense very 
unlike his natural state. In nature man was free because he was bound to no 
one and no place. This is mans' "natural liberty" with its "unlimited right to 
everything" which tempts a man with whatever he can acquire.110 In society 
the converse is true. The only freedom attainable is that in which all are 
equally bound to each other and to their state. Rousseau calls this "civil 
liberty."111 In a sense, it seems, in Rousseau's state man is free to be equally 
enslaved. The advantage of this system over the current state of affairs is that 
in modern society some are more enslaved than others. Envy is a natural 
result and social division is its product. It is interesting to note, and we shall 
return to this subject below, that Rousseau puts less trust in actual written 
laws than he does in social mores--what may perhaps be termed 'laws of the 
heart'.112 The significance of this notion will become clearer when we turn 
from the theoretical to the concrete example of a state. 
ROUSSEAU'S WORK ON POLAND RECONSIDERED 
We return now to the issue of the Poland. It is time to reconsider this 
work, which seems so contrary to his earlier work, in the light of the above. 
With his emphasis on law, his dislike of despotism and social division, is it 
109crocker, Rousseau's Social Contract p. 11 
110Rousseau, Social Contract p. 151 
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possible to believe, as many critics have, that in this text Rousseau should 
have suggested the toppling of the existing system and its replacement with a 
more egalitarian, liberal, form of government? Is it a surprise we cannot find 
such a doctrine in this text? And is it not this misunderstanding of 
Rousseau's political system which has led people like Kendall to posit and 
seek some "secret doctrine" written between the lines? 
Rousseau himself makes it quite clear that he "always insisted on the 
preservation of existing institutions holding that their destruction would 
only remove the palliatives while leaving the vices .... "113 He was, above all, 
the political theorist who "maintains the truest respect for the laws and 
national constitutions, and who has the greatest aversion to 
revolutions .... "114 We need not view this bit of writing as a clever apology 
against his detractors, for once more he stressed the avoidance of social 
division and the maintenance of the laws. This is fully consistent with his 
ear lier work. 
Yet, the troubling question remains--what of the serfs? Are they not 
men? Do they not deserve immediate liberty? Should a bad system be kept 
simply because a major change would result in anarchy? There must be 
change, it is true, but Rousseau makes it clear it cannot be rapid. It would be a 
"great and noble enterprise ... " to free the Polish serfs, but Rousseau still warns 
the Poles not to be too hasty in this direction. Before they embark on 
emancipation the reformers must make the serfs "worthy of liberty and 
113Rousseau, Judge of Jean-Jacgue p. 213 
114Rousseau, Judge of Jean-Jacque p. 213 
50 
capable of bearing it."115 This returns us to the significance of what Rousseau 
meant by "laws of the heart." 
It is not enough, Rousseau states repeatedly, to simply write laws. In 
fact he will argue that the need to do so is already a sign of a state's weakness. 
The centuries have given us plenty of written laws. It is not to these laws we 
should look for the maintenance of the republic, it is rather to the laws of the 
heart. These make written laws almost superfluous: "the greatest support for 
public authority lies in the hearts of citizens, and ... nothing can take the place 
of mores in the maintenance of the government."116 Real authority is that 
which "penetrates to the inner part of a man and is exerted no less on his will 
than on his actions."117 
The reason serfs and slaves must be made "worthy of liberty" is that 
they must first have the laws instilled into their inner being. Simply to end 
their servitude would not be to make them free. Freedom is, as so often 
noted, "obedience to the law one has prescribed for oneself .... "118 We must 
immediately add that this should not be mistaken for some brand of broad 
individualism. Rousseau previously noted that "whoever refuses to obey the 
general will will be forced to do so by the entire body. This means merely that 
115Jean-Jacque Rousseau, The Government of Poland Translated and 
introduction by Willmoore Kendall. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company. 1985) p. 30 
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he will be forced to be free."119 Once more we must call attention to the 
previous quote that the laws must "penetrate" in such a way that not only 
actions, but even the will is determined by them. There is, about this notion, 
the air of "indoctrination." 
Throughout the works of Rousseau we find an emphasis on education. 
Education is not simply, or even primarily, book-learning. Rather, he saw 
true education as learning to love one's country and being a good citizen. It is 
an education in "virtue,"120 and a respect for the laws, customs and mores of 
the fatherland. It is "education that you must count on to shape the souls of 
the citizens in a national pattern and so to direct their opinions, their likes, 
and dislikes that they shall be patriotic by inclination, passionately, of 
necessity."121 
Rousseau denied instinct, rejected natural law and even the law of 
God. In its place rests patriotic education, love of the fatherland and love of 
its laws. By implication he has declared man as infinitely malleable, and 
believes that "in the long run people are what the government makes 
them."122 The government molds, it teaches them to conform their wills to 
the general will, or mores of the state.123 It teaches them to be virtuous, 
which is nothing more than the "conformity of the private to the general 
119Rousseau, Social Contract p. 150 
120Rousseau, Political Economy p. 122 
121 Rousseau, Poland p. 19 
122Rousseau, Political Economy p. 119 
123Rousseau, Political Economy p. 119 
will.. .. "124 Virtue is synonymous to being a good patriot, i.e., willing the 
general will. Freedom is obeying it. Men do so freely, but after a life of 
indoctrinating education they could do little else. And if there appears an 
individual who manages to overcome his moral education then Rousseau 
has prescribed a simple course. He must be forced to be free. He must be 
forced to obey. 
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You may make a former slave or serf obey the written laws of the 
republic, but unless they first are trained to love the fatherland you cannot 
claim that they are virtuous, citizens, or even free. You have removed 
physical shackles, but shackles remain. Simply to remove them from 
physical servitude is irresponsible and dangerous for this introduces an 
element of anarchy and "naturalism" into civil society. Thus Rousseau is 
perfectly consistent on the issue of the serfs. They will need to be trained first 
to be citizens before they can be made so. 
ROUSSEAU AS THE CONSERVATIVE REFORMER 
In brief, the state can serve as both oppressor or benefactor to man. Yet 
even when it serves as oppressor it cannot be lightly cast aside for the simple 
reason that it in some fashion prevents the blood bath of lawlessness. Even 
in bad governments a framework is established and Rousseau is careful about 
overturning the existent framework. In the work Rousseau, Judge of Jean-
Jacgues Rousseau writes that contrary to widespread belief he never wanted to 
"plunge the universe back into its first barbarism ... " by advocating the 
124Rousseau, Political Economy p. 119 
destruction of social institutions.125 
Thus in the debate over whether Rousseau was a revolutionary or a 
conservative, it would seem that he could best be described as the careful 
tinkerer. His real revolutionary doctrines are not about the "form" of 
government but of man. In regard to the form of the state, such as Poland, 
Rousseau feared that any change in a state's institutions might not bring 
about the desired results of greater freedom, but on the contrary might 
produce even less freedom and happiness. Rousseau claimed that he had 
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"the greatest aversion to revolutions ... " though people insisted on seeing him 
as a "promoter of upheavals and disturbances .... "126 The Poland can, then, be 
read without resorting to Kendall's "secret doctrine" and the apparent 
"decoder ring" it would require. 
If there is still any doubt about his position we can take as our cue his 
attitude about returning men to the state of nature. It is unquestionable that 
he argued man was "happier" in this state than he now is. But, does he 
suggest that man should work towards returning to this state? Obviously not. 
He argues that man would no longer be happy in that state and in fact would 
be even more miserable than he is now--assuming he was even able to 
survive. The best means of increasing happiness and freedom, according to 
Rousseau, is to tinker with the existing state of affairs, not attempting to cast 
overboard what exists and restart from scratch. Rousseau is a political 
reformer, not a revolutionary. 
125Rousseau, Judge of Jean-Jacque p. 213 
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ROUSSEAU AND KANT: THE LAWS OF REASON 
The philosophic underpinnings to Rousseau's system are also now 
clearly exposed. We can see features of this system which so influenced Kant. 
In fact Rousseau foreshadows, as Charles Taylor notes, that feature of Kant 
which is most revolutionary in the history of modern moral theory.127 The 
feature which Rousseau and Kant share is the notion of morality founded 
upon "laws of reason." 
In a sense this follows, as noted above, from the idea of morality as 
convention rather than being based on some external standards. In Kant's 
hands this doctrine will result in a radical notion of "free moral subjectivity" 
which does not rest upon an "aesthetic" notion of taste or pleasure 
(happiness), but is both categorical and unconditional.128 
"What Rousseau has actually done is to redefine freedom in terms of 
an "ought," which is obedience ... to the "collective self" rather than the 
"human self," to "culture" rather than to nature.129 This "ought," which in 
itself is something of a totalitarian notion, manages to give moral laws the 
"necessity of physical laws .... "130 It is this "necessity," this "ought," which 
will play such a significant role in the understanding and work of Immanuel 
Kant. 
There is a difference as we shall shortly see, and yet the division 
127 Charles Taylor Hegel and Modern Society (New York: Cambridge 
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between the two men's notion of 'ought' is not that drastic. When Rousseau 
sums up the gains man has made by his entrance into a society he does so 
with sentiments which can be pulled, almost intact, out of the work of Kant. 
He writes that it is the "civil state of moral liberty, which alone makes man 
truly the master of himself. For to be driven by appetite alone is slavery, and 
the obedience to the law one has prescribed for oneself is liberty. "131 This is, 
in a rather uncomplicated fashion, the summation of Kant's ethical and 
metaphysical philosophy. As Cassirer writes, "Rousseau's ethics is not an 
ethics of feeling but the most categorical form of a pure ethics of 
obligation ... that was established before Kant."132 In fact, even if Kant had 
never acknowledged his debt to Rousseau this passage alone should have 
served as evidence of the debt. In the works of both there is an identification 
of the moral realm and the moral laws of behavior with reason over feelings 
and "instinct." In Kant's hands this will provide the basis of all human 
freedom in the moral realm while acknowledging necessity in the physical. 
CONCLUSION 
What can we conclude about the nature of Freedom in the works of 
Rousseau? Freedom is a consequence of political systems, and in 
contemporary states man is not free. Rousseau does not believe there is 
metaphysical freedom, but natural--i.e., lawless--freedom and the potential 
for political freedom. 
Rousseau is not interested exclusively, or perhaps even predominately, 
131Rousseau, Social Contract p. 151 
132cassirer, Question p. 96 
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in political forms, but rather in the structures of society and the molding of 
men which give these forms life. That which he calls the "convention" and 
the "free willing of the general will" will be translated by Kant into the 
"ground" or "foundation of morals." Simply changing the type of 
government will not alleviate the problems that were apparent in the prior 
form. One must go deeper than that into the mind of man himself. 
It is equally significant that by binding politics and morals Rousseau is 
also making a significant statement about morals. The conclusion one could 
draw is that there is no discussion of morals outside of a "political" context. 
In the end it is for that reason that "no people would ever be other than the 
nature of their government made them." The people are here presented as a 
product of their society, and not the other way around. 
This does seem to be in line with what Rousseau had written even in 
his first Discourse where he spent much time showing how society had 
become decadent in comparison to the Spartans and Romans. In those days, 
he notes, "politicians spoke incessantly about mores and virtue; ours speak 
only of commerce and money. "133 This same theme is also to be found in the 
Social Contract where we see that to change the individual one must first 
change the government--not simply its form, but the rational basis upon 
which it rests. This is why Rousseau spends so much time on sovereignty. 
He attempted to reinstate the general will as opposed to the false power-
structure which allows the nobles and rich to say "I am the state." He was 
133Rousseau Jean-Jacques. Discourse on the Sciences and Arts in 
Discourses and Essay on the Origin of Languages edited, translated and 
annotated by Victor Gourevitch. (New York: Harper & Row 1986) p. 12 
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seeking to create a rational basis of sovereignty and authority which was not 
subject to inequality, but which would restore all men to an equal footing. 
CHAPTER3 
KANT ON THE METAPHYSICAL PROBLEM OF FREEDOM 
INTRODUCTION: A DEBATE ON "INFLUENCE" 
It is necessary, before turning to the effects Rousseau had on the 
thinking of Kant, to state clearly from the beginning this influence is 
contested and highly debatable. Sidney Axinn, writing in the Philosophical 
Forum, emphasizes that "no study of the history of ideas should let us 
misunderstand the enormous differences between" the two men.1 Axinn 
emphasizes how fundamentally the two differ on the discussion of such 
things as the origins of man and the conception of the human species and 
human history. He seeks to "end the routine repetition of a remark" which 
was stated first by Cassirer, "about what Kant is supposed to have learned 
from Rousseau." The purpose of his article is to end the unquestioned 
assumption that Kant learned a great deal from Rousseau. Rather he claims 
that the two men's philosophy is so divergent that we can only mean "learn" 
in the sense that Kant studied and analyzed Rousseau. Such a statement is 
"harmless but empty."2 
lSidney Axinn, "Rousseau Versus Kant on the Concept of Man" in 
Philosophical Forum Vol. XII No. 4 (Boston: Boston University 1981) p. 355 
2Axinn, "Rousseau Versus Kant" p. 354 
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The point is well taken, but I believe it overstated. Axinn's argument 
should serve as a warning to the interpreter who would finds the philosophy 
of Kant as no more than a collection of ideas garnered from his predecessor. 
It should also give us pause whenever we assert a debt which is based on 
some facile similarity. But Axinn's method is seriously flawed for the same 
cause for which he so criticizes Cassirer. He has interpreted Rousseau in a 
manner which eliminates the more overt similarities between Kant and 
Rousseau, while Cassirer does the reverse. Yet, whenever depicting a debt 
owed by one thinker to another it is important to distinguish between what 
the one thought the other was saying, and what in fact the other actually did 
write. That is, to show that on specific details Rousseau and Kant differed 
widely and fundamentally is quite different than denying Rousseau's 
influence on Kant. The question really is whether there is evidence that a 
significant amount of Kant's philosophy stemmed from his reading, 
understanding, and reaction to Rousseau. Furthermore, while Axinn shows 
fairly conclusively how far apart the two were on the topics mentioned above 
there is still overwhelming evidence that "the 'transcendental turn'," which 
forms the most distinctive part of Kantian philosophy, is the result of a "prior 
'Rousseauian turn' in Kant's thought .... "136 The importance of this debt 
cannot be underestimated. When it is seen that 'reason' is linked to 
'freedom' and that 'freedom' is linked to 'moralit)" (and this is the reason 
Kant felt it was necessary to write the Critigue of Pure Reason in the first 
place) then one can see that Rousseauian elements go to the core of Kant's 
136Richard L. Velkley, Freedom and the End of Reason: On the Moral 
Foundation of Kant's Critical Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1989) p. xii 
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philosophy. Nor can we ignore Kant's own words about his debt. He recalls 
how he was "an investigator by inclination" and at one time believed that it 
was this--man living in the abstract world of the mind--which was his highest 
condition. At that time he belittle the day-to-day world of commerce and the 
society of the lowly on the streets: in his words he "despised the mob, which 
knows nothing about" abstract entities and metaphysics. But, as Hume 
startles him from his dogmatic, pre-critical, slumbers so Rousseau "set me 
straight" and Kant learned to "honor" those non-philosophic masses.137 
These are more than the musings of a man seeking to publicly elevate 
himself by a display of humanity and humility: his ethical theory was 
revolutionary because it established the common moral knowledge of the 
masses as the standard of moral philosophy. Kant took ethical standards out 
of the hands of the metaphysician and places it solidly among "Everyman." 
Newton had uncovered the laws of nature but Rousseau had 
"discovered amid the manifold human forms the deeply hidden nature of 
man, and the secret law by which Providence is justified .... "138 It is valid to 
note how the two differed, but we must also note what Kant believed 
Rousseau was saying about the "nature of man." Such an examination will 
leave little doubt that Kant at least believed himself indebted to Rousseau. 
I cannot leave this subject without noting that I believe the debate 
between those who would follow Axinn and those who would follow 
Cassirer--the one denigrating the influence and the other perhaps over-
137Kant Educational Theory p. 236 
138Immanuel Kant, cited by Ernst Cassirer, Kant's Life and Thought 
(New Haven: Yale University Press. 1981) p. 89 
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emphasizing it--may in large part be due to differences in the approach to the 
history of philosophy. One camp believes that the greatness of thinkers is in 
large respect due to their originality and tend to view "influences" largely as 
does Axinn: they are "harmless but empty." On the other extreme one will 
find those who view all philosophic constructs as little more than a reflection 
of their era, social class, nationality etc. For this camp there is no originality, 
only "influences" (I shall not place Cassirer in this extreme camp, though I 
suspect Axinn tends to view him as at least an accomplice to this extreme). In 
my treatment of Kant I will seek to avoid both extremes, and will note both 
debt and originality. With this in mind I must immediately state that it is 
unquestionable that the similarity between the two is more a matter of form 
than content. In the details Axinn is correct, the two men are poles apart. 
THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON: THE TWO REALMS 
It was mentioned above that there are certain important similarities 
between Kant and Rousseau. The t\~.1 similarity which may be noted is also 
the one most superficial and probably coincidental, but is useful to note for 
with it we may come to a clearer notion of Kant's approach to the problem. 
Rousseau began his philosophy with ah.critique~' of society and the basis upon 
which it was built. He undermined natural law as this basis. Kant was doing 
much the same in his Critique of Pure Reason. It is an irony that what is 
often taken as his major work was seen by him as merely preparatory to his 
real task. In this first Critique he intended to "deny 'knowledge' in order to 
make room for 'faith' ."139 He believed he must deprive "speculative reason" 
139Immanuel Kant, Critic of Pure Reason translated by Norman Kemp 
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of its "pretensions to transcendental insight" in order to renew a meaningful 
dialogue on issues such as freedom.140 It is the mistake dogma of 
philosophers who have not first examined the foundations of pure reason 
which lead to attacks on morality and freedom. Kant believed a careful 
examination of the limits of reason will reveal that certain issues such as 
those noted cannot be decided either way by reason alone. The Critique was, 
then, in some way nothing more than the foundational study of the truly 
important issues he treated in his later works. It is, to make an analogy, 
Kant's First and Second Discourses. But, for Kant the problem he faced is not 
natural law, but like Rousseau he does find it necessary to "clear the field" 
before constructing anew. 
Naturally,Jf!eedom is of central importance in Kant's philosophj!. Not 
only is it, of all our ideas of speculative reason, the only one known a priori 
but it serves as the basis for all knowledge of God and immortality.141 
Without freedom, Kant argued, morality would not only be impossible but 
meaningles~142 But, what is freedom and how do we know about it? Can we 
prove it exists? To place these questions into their proper context it will be 
necessary to review the condition of metaphysics Kant arrives at in the 
Critique of Pure Reason. 
Kant divided the world into two: there is the realm of noumena and 
Smith. (New York: St. Martin's Press. 1929) B:xxx p. 29 
140Kant, Pure Reason B:xxx p. 29 
141 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason translated with an 
introduction by Lewis White Beck. (New York: The Liberal Arts Press. 1956) 
p. 4 
142Kant, Practical Reason p. 4 
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the realm of phenomena. The noumena world is unknown and 
unknowable. What we know we know only through our senses, but we have 
no senses which would directly intuit the world of noumena. Instead, 
whatever strikes our senses is modified first by the intuitions of time and 
space, and then attached to some pre-existent category, or rule of the mind. 
This modification is pre-conscious and is not subject to our control. Our 
experience is determined by the structure of our own minds and thus limited 
by this structure. We are cut-off from the world of "things" and left with a 
phenomenal world of "appearances." 
The implication of such a theory is far ranging, but even more to the 
point is the effect this theory has on self-knowledge. How is the self known? 
Is it known by direct intuition? Kant denies this possibility. The self is a 
~hing-in-itself and thus a part of the noumena world. Since we have no 
means of directly experiencing this world we have no direct experience of 
pure self. The self we know is phenomenal and inferred rather than 
experienced. The basis of our inference is the unity evident in our 
experiences. The multitude (or "manifold") of our experience share a unity; a 
unity which does not arise from any particular empirical experience. Rather, 
we observe that all our experiences are, in a way, located in a particular place. 
There is nothing in the experiences of x at time t, and y at time t4 which 
connect them into a unity but that both occur in one "consciousness." Hence 
we posit a "subject" of which experience serves as object. The self, then, is 
known only by experience and is therefore a member of the phenomenal 
world. The self we know is not the "thing" but "appearance" self. 
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THE METAPHYSICAL PROBLEM OF FREEDOM 
It is at this point the problem of freedom becomes apparent. Kant 
argued, in this first Critique, that all appearance must obey universal and 
necessary rules. Appearance must be lawlike. That which is not lawlike is 
not knowable. The most famous example of law of appearances, and the one 
most germane to this discussion, is the law of causality: i.e., every event has a 
cause. The self then, it follows, is also determined by the laws of causality. It 
would necessarily follow from this that freedom is an illusion. The self 
cannot be free if it is determined by natural causality. 
But this runs directly counter to what Kant was taking such pains to 
prove. In fact in the preface to the second edition of the Critique Kant 
described his efforts as directed towards denying "knowledge, in order to 
make room for faith."143 But it now seems that he has destroyed faith in 
freedom (and thus God and immortality) by proving the self is determined. 
Kant's solution will be found in his division between the phenomena and 
noumena self, but his first step will be to examine the very notion of freedom 
in pure speculative philosophy. 
What can pure speculative philosophy tell us about freedom? 
Obviously we have the notion of freedom, and just as obviously it did not 
arise from experience. We never observe freedom for what we know from 
our senses or as a result of our mental structure is that "every event has a 
cause." Yet, there are those who argue that we can know we are free beings 
apart from any experience. This, Kant argues, is "metaphysical dogmatism" 
and it cannot serve as the basis of our belief in freedom. The reason 
143Kant, Pure Reason B:xxx p. 29 
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speculative philosophy fails to satisfy our search for freedom is that it 
inevitably ends in an "antinomy." Speculative philosophy, at best, can prove 
both that we are free and that we are causally determined. Kant seeks to 
demonstrate this in the "Third Antinomy." 
THE THIRD ANTINOMY 
There is an infinite regress in causality. Every effect has a cause, Kant 
believed he had already proved this, but this cause is itself the effect of a 
previous cause, and that of an earlier cause. Taken to its logical extreme we 
find there can never be "a first beginning .... "144 This, however is self-
contradictory for it violates our understanding of the causal chain.145 We 
must assume, then, a first cause which is not itself an effect. This too is 
contradictory, but inescapable. We can only resolve these contradictions by 
assuming that something stands outside of "nature" (the sum total of our 
phenomenal experiences conditioned by law-like rules of thought) and is, 
then, transcendentally free. This thing may so impinge itself on nature that it 
may set off a series of events with "absolute spontaneity."146 This is not 
simply an argument for a Prime Mover, for Kant distinguishes between the 
"absolute first beginning" in time and the initiator of a causal chain.147 The 
first is problematic since time is no more than a medium of our intuitions--it 
has no existence, or at best an unknown existence, apart from our experiences. 
144Kant, Pure Reason A:446 p. 410 
145Kant, Pure Reason A:446 p. 410 
146Kant, Pure Reason A:446 p. 410 
147Kant, Pure Reason B:478 p. 413 
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Furthermore, it is not a solution which can give us the desired "free will" for 
once a spontaneous action impresses itself upon nature it sets off a causal 
chain which carries with it mechanistic determinacy. Thus, the action of a 
Prime Mover would still leave us determined. 
But, while there is no absolute beginning "in time" Kant did believe he 
,,{ 
had shown the possibility of "relative" beginnings.148 fyhat is, it is possible for 
there to be several different "first causes" each setting off a causal chain in the 
phenomenal world.' The initiator of these causal chains will be that which 
stands outside of nature--the thing in itself. The "thing" can serve as cause 
without itself being caused. The "thing" is free, and since the noumena-self is 
a "thing," then that self is free while the phenomenal self, which is in nature, 
remains determined. 
It would be in error to view this argument as Kant's proof of freedom. 
Set alongside this thesis is its antithesis in which he argues that "there is no 
freedom; everything in the world takes place solely in accordance with laws of 
nature."149 It is unnecessary to dwell on this antithesis, since the whole of 
the Critigue argues for the inescapability of the "laws of nature." What is 
important, however, is that according to pure, speculative philosophy both 
arguments, taken alone, are valid, and one is as provable as the other. This 
means that pure speculative reason is left with a paradox which cannot be 
escaped. Reason becomes "divided against itself" by proving two statements 
-which stand in apparent contradiction.150 ,Beason, by speculative philosophy, 
148Kant, Pure Reason B:478 p. 413 
149Kant, Pure Reason A:445 p. 409 
150Kant, Pure Reason B:492 p. 423 
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cannot avoid this stalemate, nor can experience settle the issue one way or lhe 
other.151 What, then, has been proved? Only that the speculative use of ! 
reason is unable to decide the issue of freedom, and the proof of freedom 
must be sought on other terms. 
The positive element, however, which Kant saw in this stalemate was 
that "for speculative reason, the concept of freedom was problematic but not 
impossible .... "152 Speculative reason may not prove "freedom" but it cannot 
prove there is no freedom either. Speculation can make no authoritative 
conclusion, and the possibility of freedom is not endangered by any 
philosophy which is based on speculative reason. Neither morality nor 
freedom are threatened by the laws of science. Speculative reason cannot 
threaten anyone's peace of mind with proofs of determinism. 
CAUSALITY AND TIME IN THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM 
Transcendental philosophy has much more to say about freedom than 
does speculative philosophy. Kant had already shown that there is a 
noumena world and a phenomenal world. He had shown that time was a 
medium of the phenomenal world as causality (based as it is on time 
sequences) is a category of the mind. Causality involves a necessary series of 
events a,b,c, which cannot be reversed or altered. Time, then, is an essential 
feature of determinacy. But Kant also holds that "time is only a condition of 
151Kant, Pure Reason B:560 p. 464 
152Kant, Practical Reason p. 3 
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appearances, not of things in themselves."153 If things in themselves are not 
in time then the notion of causality holding for them is nonsensical; and if 
causality does not hold for noumena things then it is meaningless to view 
them as being subject to determinacy.154 They must, therefore, be free. 
This position Kant believed would be more obvious if people avoided 
the "common but fallacious presupposition of the 'absolute reality' of 
appearances .... "155 To view our experiences, the phenomenal world of 
appearances, as "real" or at least as the "one" reality leads us to conclude that 
as everything in nature follows the laws of causality, then determinacy is 
unavoidable. But: 
if ... appearances are not taken for more than they 
actually are; if they are viewed not as things in themselves, 
but merely as representation, connected according to 
empirical laws, they must themselves have grounds which 
are not appearances.156 
And, we may add, this "ground" will not follow the laws of empirical 
appearance. 
CONCLUSION 
Kant's claims may be viewed as a negative assertion. This is significant, 
for a positive claim would violate his own tenets about the impossibility of 
knowing about "things in themselves." His assertion that the "thing" is free 
153Kant, Pure Reason B:567 p. 468 
154Kant, Pure Reason B:568 p. 468 
155Kant, Pure Reason B:564 p. 466 
156Kant, Pure Reason B:565 p. 467 
amounts, at this point, to no more than that the laws of appearance do not 
hold for non-appearance. 
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It is also important to recognize, noted Kant, that we cannot 
meaningfully consider an action as beginning "in this active being itself; but 
we may quite correctly say that the active being of itself begins its effects in the 
sensible world."157 To assert that an activity begins "in" a noumena self is to 
ascribe a time sequence to the noumena world. This, of course, cannot be 
done for in the noumena world " ... there can be no change requiring dynamic 
determination in time .... "158 We can now say, according to Kant, that 
"freedom and nature (the natural, lawlike world of appearance) ... can exist 
together without any conflict, in the same actions .... "159 The apparent 
contradiction into which speculative reason fell is now shown by 
transcendental philosophy to be merely a contrary statement. One and the 
same event can be both determined in a natural, empirical sense and be the 
result of a freedom.160 
157Kant, Pure Reason B:569 p. 469 
158Kant, Pure Reason B:569 p. 469 
159Kant, Pure Reason B:569 p. 469 
160Kant, Pure Reason B:572-73 pp. 470-71 
CHAPTER4 
PRACTICAL REASON, MORALITY AND THE EVIDENCE FOR FREEDOM 
INTRODUCTION: KANT'S OBJECTIONS TO THE "HAPPINESS PRINCIPLE" 
Before discussing how Kant believed he could demonstrate the 
"probability" of freedom we must first consider his objections to the solution 
offered by Rousseau and his other contemporaries. It is in his objections to 
"empirical" morality and the "happiness" principle that Kant's system is 
shown most clearly. We will introduce his objections by once more 
considering the notion of freedom in Rousseau. 
Freedom, in the works of Rousseau. is a consequence of political 
systems. For Rousseau there is no metaphysical freedom, only natural--i.e., 
lawless--freedom and the potential for political freedom. Kant could agree 
with Rousseau's estimation of contemporary society as corrupt and 
repressive, but was troubled by the conclusion that freedom has no separate 
metaphysical existence apart from the political order. More was at stake here 
than Kant's proclivity towards rationalism. Kant saw Rousseau's conclusions 
as a challenge in much the same fashion as had been Hume's attacks on 
causality. Kant believed that acceptance of Rousseau's position had the 
unfortunate result of removing the foundation of all morality. The loss of 
metaphysical freedom was the loss of morals. Kant realized that the base of 
the problem lay in his contemporary' s evaluation of reason. Rousseau, and 
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others, had made reason depend upon the passions and on the formation of 
society. Kant believed otherwise. 
To establish the possibility of freedom, Kant believed he must 
demonstrate the fallacy of his contemporaries' notions of reason and the 
foundation of their moral theories. He rooted out what he believed to be the 
mistaken premises on which both were founded by asking "what is the basis 
of morality?" Kant's solution will be that: "the sole principle of morality 
consists in independence from all material of the law (i.e., a desired object) 
and in the accompanying determination of choice by the mere form of giving 
universal law which a maxim must be capable of having."161 These are the 
two pillars of Kant's view of morality. On the one hand to be a moral 
decision the decision cannot take into account the possible, or even probable 
results of that choice. In other words, the decision must have an element of 
timelessness. On the other hand the choice must have universal validity, i.e., 
it is not bound to any particular place or situation. 
Kant argued that for a decision to be moral we cannot be concerned 
with ends. Moral decisions have, then, a timelessness about them. Kant 
acknowledged that all rational creatures seek their own happiness.162 It does 
not follow, however, that this pursuit is particularly moral or even useful in 
morality. To act in a manner with the hope of a particular outcome is 
empirical, and hence not a law according to Kant. If we seek happiness by the 
pursuit of certain goals we are making "subjective" decisions. That is, we 
acknowledge that the means we use today for the attainment of this 
161Kant, Practical Reason p. 33 
162Kant, Practical Reason p. 24 
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happiness are not necessarily the means we will use tomorrow, or have used 
in the past. Nor should we expect that the means, or even the goals, we set to 
realize our happiness are the same that other people will use or set. 
Happiness, is a "particular feeling of pleasure .. .in each man, and even of the 
differences in needs occasioned by changing feeling in one and the same 
man."163 It is now time to take a closer look at the "happiness" principle. 
If the desire for happiness or pleasure is at the root of our actions, could 
we say that this form of causality was the result of rational principles? 
Perhaps, but certainly there would be important reservations. First, as noted, 
any action which has as an end some form of pleasure cannot be described as 
universal or necessary.164 Pleasures differ from one individual to another 
and even from one moment in an individuals life to another. For example, 
suppose an individual is setting up a business. To insure that her customers 
will consistently return she may adopt the principle that "honesty is the best 
policy." The end which is sought is the establishment of a good name and a 
successful business. This may well be rational, and one could say that the 
owner is acting under a rational imperative. It is not, however, a categorical 
i.e., necessary and universal, imperative. Subjectively it is necessary--that is, 
it is necessary at this moment to attain the sought for end, but one cannot 
leap from this to categorical necessity. This can be made clearer by continuing 
the example. Suppose her father falls seriously ill. The illness is serious and 
possibly fatal and the treatment requires strict observance. Thus, the doctors 
tell her, much depends on her father's frame of mind--he must not give up 
163Kant, Practical Reason pp. 24-25 
164Kant, Practical Reason p. 18 
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hope and end the treatment. She is now faced with a dilemma. She may 
inform her father of the seriousness of the disease under the imperative 
"honesty is the best policy" or she may lie and down play the seriousness of 
her father's illness, hoping thereby to keep up his spirit. The point is the 
imperative now must be re-examined and no longer serves as a necessary 
rule, for "this necessity is dependent on only subjective conditions .... "165 
Thus, "honesty is the best policy" cannot qualify as a categorical imperative, 
but is shown to be simply a "hypothetical imperative." That is, it is 
"conditional" for it determines the will "only in respect to a desired effect" 
and is therefore a "practical" or, for the purpose of distinguishing it from his 
later use of this term, a pragmatic precept and not a universal, necessary 
law.166 
Kant argued, that all pragmatic precept are "without exception 
empirical. "167 Precepts are empirical when an end is desired and the precept 
is formulated to attain it.168 Whenever we conceive of some "object" and 
seek it, we are pursuing pleasure.169 Both "object" and "pleasure" should be 
read here in the broadest sense. The owner's desire for good business may be 
viewed as her object, just as the recovery of her father was her object. They 
are her immediate goals. 
165Kant, Practical Reason p. 19 
166Kant, Practical Reason p. 18 
167Kant, Practical Reason p. 19 
168Kant, Practical Reason p. 19 
169Kant, Practical Reason p. 20 
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"Pleasure" is also a goal, for it is the "relation of a representation to the 
subject by feelings."170 This goal is represented to the individual who 
pursues a certain course of actions to attain it. It is desired, not in and of itself, 
but because attaining it is believed to bring some form of advantage. But, 
desire is from the senses, it is a feeling.171 It is not purely rational for reason 
conceives of a goal purely by concepts.172 For Kant, the realm of the rational 
is devoid of all subjectivity and feelings.173 
Since with empirical precepts we cannot know before attaining the goal 
whether it will bring pleasure, pain or indifference we cannot claim a priori 
justification for the goal.174 That is, only after the fact can we determine 
whether the goal which we thought would bring us pleasure actually does so. 
Returning to the businesswoman this may be clarified. Obviously she may 
decide that it is better to lie to her father in the hope that his recovery may be 
more assured. It is just as possible, however, that her father, not realizing the 
seriousness of his condition, neglects certain necessary elements of treatment 
that would ensure his recovery. He may fail to take his medicine and, in the 
end, do more harm to himself than the awareness of his condition would 
have done. After the fact it becomes clear it would have been better to tell the 
truth. Yet, the opposite action on her part could lead to similar unpleasant 
170Kant, Practical Reason p. 20 
171 Kant, Practical Reason p. 20 
172Kant, Practical Reason p. 20 
173Kant, Practical Reason p. 24 
174Kant, Practical Reason p. 20 
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results. She informs her father of the seriousness of his condition and the 
father in hopelessness, refuses treatment. Obviously, in this case it becomes 
clear a lie may well have served better. Yet, the outcome could not be 
determined beforehand strictly on a priori grounds. The pragmatic precept 
proves itself only after the fact. 
Therefore, if happiness is a goal the means to attain this happiness will 
undergo numerous variations--and we may find that the happiness of one 
man is a direct contradiction to the happiness of another. Happiness between 
individuals varies and is not a priori. Since it is not a priori it has no 
certainty or universality. Thus, two men doing business may hold different 
maxims of behavior in their relations to each other. The one man may hold 
that "honesty is the best policy" if he wishes to enjoy the pleasure of repeat 
customers and long term profits, while the other man, who has a sick child at 
home in need of some expensive medical procedure, may hold as a maxim of 
action that everything must be sacrificed to the good of his child, including 
his good reputation and the goodwill of his business relations. The first 
weighs with fairness the products he sells while the other is doing everything 
in his power to stretch his produce with false weights and filler. Which is the 
moral man? Kant seems right that if happiness is used as a standard neither 
man can be faulted for their actions. On some standards it would be possible 
to argue that the man who cheats is actually the more moral of the two for he 
seeks happiness not just for himself but for his child--and while the "honest" 
man imposes his maxim for the attainment of a more pleasant way of life, the 
cheating man does so for the very basics of life. Certainly acts done for the 
sake of one's dying child are more noble, and "moral," than those done for 
the sake of luxurious living. Equally significant is that we may suppose one 
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and the same person to be both the honest and the dishonest in different time 
periods. That is, the honest man becomes the cheating man when forced by 
the necessity of his child's sudden illness. 
Yet, how can one and the same standard produce such contrary 
actions? How can a "standard" of behavior produce contradictory actions? A 
standard such as this, by the variety of contradictory actions it allows and 
even approves, cannot be said to have the quality of "universality." 
Furthermore, as noted, another difficulty arises in such a standard. We have 
no way of telling or deciding a priori which action will best lead us to 
happiness. It is only "after the fact" that we are able to determine which 
actions best led to happiness. But, what is the use of a maxim of behavior or 
standard which cannot determined before-hand what acts will better lead to a 
particular goal than another (perhaps contradictory) set of standards and acts? 
What type of standard of action cannot determine the best action before an 
action occurs? Such a "standard" hardly deserves this name if it is only able 
to determine the value of an act after the fact. 
Happiness is therefore not a valid criteria or standard of behavior. 
Perhaps to avoid this dilemma we should use as a standard the "greatest 
happiness for all" principle, but what is the evidence of this? Why should 
someone be forced to make a decisions upon such a principle of behavior, 
especially when following this principle may often lead to his unhappiness? 
In some way the principle of "greatest good" goes outside the boundaries of 
personal happiness and self-love. It seems to call into play some notion of 
equity which can hardly compensate for the loss of individual happiness and 
freedom. 
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KANT ON "SELF LOVE" AND INSTRUMENTALISM 
This brings us to another of Kant's arguments against this empirical 
standard. Rousseau and others had argued that the primary moral sentiment 
was "self-love." He argued that by nature everyone had this self-love, and 
that if everyone followed this moral sentiment everyone would be moral. In 
the Second Discourse he used this notion to argue that natural man was both 
moral and good, and it was only with the establishment of society and the 
burial of self-love by selfishness that man grew evil. The best form of social 
order, according to this view, would be the one which replaced this self-love 
at the highest pinnacle of morality, and assured that it will be adopted as the 
standard of action by all. This runs counter to the whole of Kant's thinking, 
not only about society, but morality itself. 
Kant will show that even were it true that everyone partook of this 
self-love, yet this would not qualify it as a moral standard, for it would be 
descriptive rather than prescriptive. Even if everyone agreed that self-love 
served as the goal and everyone agreed on the means of attaining this goal 
this principle of self-love could not serve in a law-like fashion for 
determining the will "for the unanimity itself would be merely contingent. 
The determining ground would still be only subjectively valid and empirical, 
and it would not have necessity .... "175 Kant was here, according to Beck, 
"warning against allowing any empirical principle to be called a law .... "176 
Kant's response to Rousseau, therefore, is that self-love, though it may be 
175Kant, Practical Reason p. 25 
176Lewis White Beck, A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical 
Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1960) p. 83 
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beneficial and unanimous, cannot serve as a standard of morality since it lack 
the element of necessity: "the maxim of self-love merely advises; the law of 
morality commands. "177 Kant believed this demonstrated that there must be 
another ground for behavior, one which is both universal and necessary. It 
must, therefore, be a priori, and for Kant this meant it would be purely 
rational without any mixture of the empirical. 
Moral law must be sought in the pure realm of reason, but, once more, 
not in the Rousseauian sense of reason. Reason in the philosophy of 
Rousseau is "instrumentalist." That is, he believed the purpose and end of 
reason was to insure the well-being of man. Reason was not an end in itself. 
Well used it would construct favorable social institutions which would 
produce a state of equality and happiness comparable to a state of nature. 
Reason was, for Rousseau, the means of attaining in society what was lost 
with the emergence of society. Reason is a product of society, but that does 
not disqualify it from being social man's best hope in the view of Rousseau. 
Rousseau took pains to show in the two Discourses that it had not been used 
that way and has been the bane of man, causing envy, lust, and inequality. 
But if used rightly it could prove man's salvation and if placed in the hands 
of some worthy legislator, like Rousseau, man could be steered by reason into 
his own, best hope. Rousseau is ever the political philosopher and his 
treatment of reason reflected his objectives. 
Kant, on the other hand, was always the metaphysician, even when 
seemingly despising the profession. Reason was, for Kant, its own end. He 
shared with Rousseau the belief that reason was the last, best hope for 
177Kant, Practical Reason p. 37 
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mankind, but happiness was not the final goal of reason. Happiness may be 
produced along the way, it may be a product of reason attaining its ends, but 
this does not mean that reason's aim is the attaining of happiness. This view 
is simply too empirical for Kant. It assumes, once more, that we can know 
before-hand what will actually make us happy--a position Kant rejected on 
grounds already discussed. Kant will go so far as to suggest that the human 
species may progress along the road to the rational ends, but this does not 
mean that the condition of the individual person will significantly improve 
or grow "happier." In fact, Kant rejects 'eudaemonic' philosophy because, 
when looking at the individual with his mixture of equal parts good and evil, 
one cannot conclude that the species is progressing or indeed could ever 
progress.178 Yet, progress is undeniable for the species (this was the 
Enlightenment period after all, and few individuals--with the noted 
exception of Rousseau--were willing to even entertain the notion that the 
Enlightenment was a reversal rather than progress). Reason progresses on its 
own. The species as a whole grows better even if individuals are no happier 
or noticeably better. 
Kant's arguments against "instrumentalism" did not rest solely on his 
notion of progress. He had another and, for the present purposes, more 
significant argument against the idea that reason's goal is to attain happiness. 
This argument is central to his ethical theory and may be found in many 
shapes throughout the whole of his works. A good example is in his work 
"The End of All Things" where Kant discussed Christianity. The underlying 
178Immanuel Kant, "An Old Question Raised Again: Is the Human 
Race Constantly Progressing" in On History, ed. by Lewis White Beck. (New 
York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc. 1963) p. 140 
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question to this essay is "should we be Christians?" to which he answered 
with a guarded "yes." The crux of the discussion is over what value there is 
in Christianity? Is its value the promise of heaven at the end of a troubled 
life? Shall we be Christians for the sake of going to heaven? "No," said Kant, 
for this would be to think of Christianity's value in terms of a "bribe" offered 
by God to man for "good conduct"?179 If that is the value of Christianity then 
it is worthless. One must not be required to act in a certain manner for the 
hope of rewards, for "only a desire for such actions which arise from 
disinterested motives can inspire human respect...therefore, we must not 
think that the promised rewards are intended to be taken for the incentives of 
the actions."180 It will later be clearer how this section ideally reflects the 
central treatise of Kantian ethics, but for now I wish to point out that Kant is 
thoroughly consistent on this position. Actions, and that means "moral 
actions," must be done freely and with disinterest. They cannot be done for 
the hope of a reward, for then they are neither free nor disinterested. 
Happiness may be produced along the way, just as "heaven" may be attained 
as a result of a "Christian" life, but these are not essential, but accidental, 
elements. Therefore, while there is no evidence that individuals are getting 
better or happier this is not a problem if reason is unconcerned with 
individual happiness or benefit. 
Once more, Kant's approach is metaphysical while Rousseau's was 
political. They disagreed widely on the purpose and nature of reason, and 
179Immanuel Kant, "The End of All Things" in On History, ed. by 
Lewis White Beck. (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc. 1963) p. 83 
180Kant, "End of All Things" p. 83 
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this is reflected in every aspect of their work. The uniqueness of Kant's 
position is that "morality is to be entirely separated from the motivation of 
happiness or pleasure. "181 Reason must have its own end which will 
distinguish it from empirical ends. Only then can we claim that reason meets 
the necessary criteria as a standard of behavior. If reason is bound to 
producing happiness then we will have the same dilemma with reason that 
we had with "happiness" for we will be unable to determine which of the 
contradictory means of attaining this end will best lead us to the greatest 
happiness. This was, according to Taylor, a revolution in morals.182 
THE INTERNAL LAW: THE "OUGHT" AND DUTY 
At issue in the whole of the preceding discussion is the notion of 
"prescriptive principles." What prescriptive weight does an empirical 
generalization bear? Kant argued that it had none. It can note the way things 
have previously been done--much as Hume will leave one with the option of 
saying only that the sun has risen in the past--but it cannot prescribe the way 
things "ought" to be done. It carries with it no necessity, and thus bears the 
title 'law' gingerly and without conviction. Beck uses the example of a falling 
object and Galileo's law.183 Galileo's law accurately described the state of 
affairs which have so far occurred, but it does not prescribe the course of any 
particular object. Rather, any exception to the rule by an object results in the 
re-classification of the object. If moral laws are empirical then a subject may 
181 Taylor Hegel p. 4 
182Taylor Hegel p. 4 
183Beck, Commentary on Kant's Critigue p. 83 
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decide to simply abstain from the general consensus. What charge can be 
brought against such a decision? Galileo's law at least expressed a natural, 
physical, necessity, but what necessity can there possible be to such a moral 
law--even if so far everyone agreed with it? It is no more than a contingent 
principle which may still be altered. Yet, if a law has no necessity, how can we 
say it is prescriptive and not simply descriptive? We cannot. Once more we 
see the long shadow of Hume. In order for a law to be moral it must exhibit 
necessity and have a prescriptive characteristic. 
We may now sum-up Kant's position to this point. In the Critique of 
Pure Reason Kant had shown that that which belongs to the empirical world, 
the world of the senses, must also be determined by the laws of nature. Thus, 
it follows that a decision based on an empirical precept is not free but subject 
to the laws of causality. This means we cannot seek the foundation of 
morality in empirical goals, but must turn instead to reason. 
Speculative reason, as Kant demonstrated in the first Critique had 
proven unfruitful in the question of freedom. The "employment" of 
speculative reason on the issue of freedom is "notwithstanding the very 
heavy labor which [it] impose[s] upon our reason, entirely useless."184 
Transcendental philosophy, on the other hand is only slightly more fruitful. 
But for all its efforts it goes no further than establishing the uncontradictory 
possibility of freedom. Finally, there can also be no empirical basis for 
establishing moral actions. All must now give way to practical reason. 
Practical reason is variously defined by Kant, but in general it "deals 
with the grounds determining the will." This definition requires further 
184Kant, Pure Reason B:827 p. 661 
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refinement by defining "will," since in Kant even the most common word 
often takes on an uncommon meaning. Kant defined 'will' as "a faculty 
either of bringing forth objects corresponding to conceptions or of 
determining itself .... "185 In other places Kant equated will and practical 
reason,186 but to prevent confusion I would like to maintain their distinction 
for the moment. 
What determines the will? How can the will produce actions in such a 
way that it "brings forth" results which are in line with a concept or plan of 
reason? As Kant had previously noted a causality which is apart from the 
empirical, sensuous world of nature would be "a causality of freedom." That 
which is able to spontaneously set off a causal chain in and of itself would be 
free in the sense that it is not constrained by nature. Yet why should we 
assume there is in us a will which transcends the natural order? What 
evidence is there of such a will, and why should we believe that this will is a 
product of reason and not empirical inclinations? 
Kant believed that if we examine morality we can prove some form of 
rational freedom, or at least the necessity of its existence. It does not follow 
that we will completely understand the nature of freedom, but we may at 
least be able to conclude the existence of a causality separate from the natural 
order, and hence a realm free from nature. The proper place to begin this 
inquiry is with the question "why do we do what we do?" What forces drive 
185Kant, Practical Reason p. 15 
186Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, in 
Ethical Philosophy. Translated by James W. Ellington. (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company. 1983) p. 23 
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us, especially when we are faced with moral actions? Is there a principle, or 
set of principles, behind these actions, and if so from where do they arise? 
As was noted before we describe, by use of natural law and experience, 
what actually happens; it is the moral law which tells us what "ought" to 
happen.187 It is this notion of ought which will serve as the key to Kant's 
concept of freedom. 
What did Kant mean by "ought," that is, what is its significance. 
Another example may make this clearer. Let us suppose some individual has 
engaged in a series of bank robberies. We can descriptively relate this 
individual's activities, we can bring to bear the background conditions which 
led up to the robberies, we can describe what this individual hoped to gain 
from these robberies, but, according to Kant, we are completely without 
ground in determining guilt--or the wrongness of these actions--by empirical 
laws. 
Empirical laws may well describe the action, may well explain the 
wants, and desires which determined this action; but it cannot explain why 
the action was wrong. To suggest that an action should or should not occur 
presupposes a causality which is not empirical; it presupposes an "ought." To 
say that something ought to be done, or to say we ought to do such and such 
reveals an obligation which steps outside the natural world. The "ought" 
suggest that certain actions should or should not be done without regard for 
individual desires, conditions, or situations. Thus, this obligation must arise, 
not from experience but from pure reason for: 
187Kant, Grounding for Metaphysics p. 20 
reason commands how one ought to act, even though no 
instance of such action might be found; moreover, reason 
pays no attention to the advantage which can accrue to us 
from such action, which admittedly only experience could 
teach .... 
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Thus we find that "reason of itself and independently of all experience 
commands what ought to happen."188 These rational laws--moral 
imperatives--if truly pure are categorical: they are a priori, universal and 
necessary, not just for humans but for all rational beings.189 They also have a 
practical relevance, for they serve to determine actions; they determine the 
will. 
MAN AS RATIONAL BEING 
Kant, having established the possibility of a non-empirical causality 
now focused his attention on man as a rational being. Man know nature 
through his senses, and thus knows or can know empirical laws. But, he 
seems to know himself not only through his senses but also by " ... acts and 
inner determinations which he cannot regard as impressions of the 
senses."190 Man is not only phenomenal but in "respect of certain faculties 
the action of which cannot be ascribed to the receptivity of sensibility (he is) a 
purely intelligible object."191 Precisely what are these "certain faculties"? 
They are reason and understanding.192 Reason, Kant stated, gives us 
188Kant, Grounding for Metaphysics p. 20 
189Kant, Grounding for Metaphysics p. 20-23 
190Kant, Pure Reason B:574 p. 472 
191Kant, Pure Reason B:575 p. 472 
192Kant, Pure Reason B:575 p. 472 
"imperatives" which are the rules of the mind. They imply the ought, 
"which is found nowhere else in the whole of nature."193 When we view 
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nature we ask of it only what has happened, we do not ask of it what "ought" 
to happen for the notion of ought is inapplicable to nature.194 But reason, 
Kant argued is not limited to the purely descriptive "what happened." 
Instead, reason: 
frames for itself with perfect spontaneity an order of its own ... 
to which it adapts the empirical conditions, and according to 
which it declares actions to be necessary, even although they 
have never taken place, and perhaps never will take place.195 
Reason operates on necessary laws which are not determined by the laws of 
nature, nor even on the possibility of realizing these actions in the empirical 
world. That is, empirical criteria cannot be applied to the laws of reason to 
determine their validity. Thus, these laws are not the result of experience nor 
are they bound by experience. It seems, Kant continued, that "reason also 
presupposes that it can have causality .... " in the empirical world, i.e., a 
phenomenological effect.196 
This was a presupposition of the utmost importance. Kant was 
proposing that reason is subject to laws other than the those of the natural 
order, and that reason may in fact impose itself upon the natural order as a 
causal agent. In a sense this is analogous to Rousseau's self-imposed laws. 
193Kant, Pure Reason B:575 p. 472 
194Kant, Pure Reason B:575 p. 472 
195Kant, Pure Reason B:576 p. 473 
196Kant, Pure Reason B:576 p. 473 
87 
According to Kant, these laws arise wholly from within and are not 
something imposed upon man or learned in the course of his life Thus, the 
noumena world and the phenomenal world would meet in the "will" of 
man (or any rational being). Pure reason would have practical content since 
it would determine the behavior of a phenomenal being apart from the 
lawful order of the natural realm. The "ought," therefore, would be the law 
of reason in practice, the basis of all moral imperatives--it would be the only 
standard possible for a true morality since it is prescriptive and not 
descriptive like empirical and physical laws. If such a external causality could 
be shown to exist the conclusion would inevitable be that in an important 
sense pure reason would be free: 
for since reason is not itself an appearance, and is not subject to 
any condition of sensibility (including time) ... the dynamical law 
of nature, which determines succession in time in accordance 
with rules, is not applicable to it.197 
In other words, since time is a criteria of the phenomenal realm, and if reason 
can be shown to exist apart from this realm, then reason is not subject to time. 
It is timeless in the truest sense of the world--not in that it lasts "forever" (for 
even this concept is one that assumes the existence of time), but rather it does 
not exist in the same realm as does time. It is dangerous to step onto the 
slippery slope of idealism and questions of "reality," but in a way time is not 
"real." It is simply the "form" of certain experiences. According to Kant, if 
reason exists apart from time, and if cause and effect are ultimately dependent 
for their existence upon time then we must conclude that reason also is freed 
197Kant, Pure Reason B:581 p. 476 
from the binding affect of causality. We cannot speak of reason being 
"caused" by anything since this would be to subject reason to a form of 
experience that reason precedes, or at least transcends. 
REASON AS GROUND TO FREEDOM 
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This was Kant's solution to the problem of freedom. Reason itself 
imposes upon our acts. It is a reason detached from the natural world, and 
while it is not something which we can succinctly define or understand in its 
essence we witness its existence and influence every time we make a 
statement about how things "ought" to have been or what we /1 ought" to 
have done. The sense of /1 ought" is the manifestation of our pure reason 
dicta ting to us the correct course of action. 
This is not to say that humans ever act on absolutely pure reason. Kant 
placed humans midway on the scale between a pure or "holy" will and 
"animal choice"--a choice "determined solely by inclination."198 As Kant 
noted "human choice .. .is such as to be affected but not determined by 
impulses. Accordingly, in itself .. .it is not pure .... "199 Yet, pure reason lifts 
human choice out of animal impulse. It is for this cause that the categorical 
imperative is presented to the human will as an "ought," for a perfectly good 
being would have no need for a law. Rather, a "holy" will would conceive of 
the good and act on the good automatically in the same moment. There 
would be no struggle with conflicting impulses. It is, however, the mixed 
constitution of the human will which makes the categorical imperative not 
198Kant, Metaphysics of Morals p. 12 
199Kant, Metaphysics of Morals p. 12 
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automatic but rather a means " ... for expressing the relation of objective laws 
of willing in general to the subjective imperfection of the will ... "200 The 
categorical imperative acts as a standard upon which we measure our actions 
and choice. It is the fact that we operate not simply by animal inclination 
which demonstrated the practical significance of pure reason. 
The very fact that our actions are not solely determined by animal 
impulse means that our actions are not completely determined by natural 
causality. The fact that pure reason has practical applicability, that it at least 
co-determines the will, means that human actions are at least partially free. 
In practical philosophy freedom proves it existence in that it determines 
choice "independently of all empirical conditions."201 Freedom is 
demonstrated by the fact that there exists in rational creatures another form of 
causality. A causality which is not empirical. A causality which arises 
separately form the natural order. Thus, it is the moral law which is able to 
do what speculative philosophy could not do--give "objective reality" to 
freedom, for the fact that we can will to act, and to some extent even act, in a 
manner contrary to our animal, physical, inclination is for Kant the evidence 
of another form of law determining our will.202 A law which is pure and not 
subject to the laws of causality. 
200Kant, Grounding for Metaphysics p. 24 
201 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals p. 20-21 
202Kant, Practical Reason p. 49 
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In our phenomenological existence we are determined by the laws of 
natural necessity, but in pure reason, the noumena realm, we are not subject 
to these laws. Rather we are, in pure reason, subject to a separate law which 
does not arise from experience nor is determined by experience. As sensuous 
beings we are determined, but as pure intellectual beings we are free. 
Here then, is Kant's formation of a "rule by law" which established the 
freedom of the individual as Rousseau had tried to do before him. The two 
notions are superficially similar though both claim the law of reason as 
justification for their belief in freedom. Rousseau complicated this definition 
with his instrumentalist approach to reason and his reliance upon the 
"general will." Kant may validly wonder what mechanism is in place which 
assured Rousseau of the rationality of the general will. Rousseau may claim 
that "whatever the 'general will' wills" is correct and rational by definition 
because there is no other criteria of rationality or correctness, but this seems to 
trivialize the issue, and gives the lie to what Rousseau seemed to be doing 
himself when he assumed the mantle of the "legislator." In other words, 
Rousseau is himself the best evidence against the position he seemed to be 
presenting. Rousseau may seek to justify himself from this charge by arguing 
that he is doing no more than what the "general will" would do if it had the 
chance to do so, but this in itself seems to amount to a realization of a 
"correct" and "incorrect" perspective which has little to do with the context. 
Rousseau is admitting to an a priori criteria, though he himself is unaware 
that he does so. He is implicitly acknowledging a moral or rational principle 
which precedes the actual establishment of a just state. 
Once more we return to Kant's notion of the determining rational 
principle. This principle served much the same function as did Rousseau's 
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"general will," for as the general will was to mold and shape, not only actions, 
but even the wishes of the individual, so Kant's rational principle determines 
the will, and the subsequent actions of the individual. Kant, however, did 
not believe, as did Rousseau, that this moral will can be taught. In fact, Kant 
clearly rejected this Rousseauian solution in his work The Metaphysics of 
Morals. For Kant there were two realms of laws, just as there are two realms 
of being. The division, for Kant, is between the political realm of law and the 
moral. In each realm we discover a rule of law, but the "incentives" in each 
differ. Roughly put the external realm, the political, uses as incentives for 
actions everything except "duty." In this realm there is brought to bear all 
manner of incentives ranging from threat of force (Rousseau's "force them to 
be free") to hope of reward. We can be forced, for example, to drive at a 
certain speed for fear of a ticket. We can be forced to respect the domain of 
our neighbor by not carrying off the shovel he left in his yard overnight, or 
sleeping with his wife when he is away from home, by the fear of the bodily 
harm he would inflict upon us if he caught us. On the other hand, we may 
act in certain ways, not from fear but for hope of some certificate or public 
expression of recognition. Rousseau thought the Republic should employ 
this type of incentive constantly. It will be found in Poland to be the preferred 
means of creating the civic spirit he feels necessary. It is also the means 
frequently used in Socialist economic systems such as the late East Germany 
and in U.S. factories like Motorola. In both cases spotless attendance for some 
considerable period is rewarded, not with financial compensation, but with a 
pin which may be worn on the lapel. In both cases it will usually bear the 
logo "excellent service award." Naturally, monetary compensation for 
noteworthy behavior is also a frequent incentive. None of these methods are 
moral, and one means of enforcing certain behavior is just as amoral as 
another. In the end, we are coerced to act in a particular manner. 
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But, there is another form of incentive which is moral. It stems from 
within the individual himself. I may be forced to act in a particular manner 
from an outside force, but there also exists within me a sense of duty and an 
"oughtness" which is not dependent upon any outside influence. Kant writes 
that "that lawgiver which makes an action a duty and also makes this duty 
the incentive is 'ethical."'203 The "lawgiver" in this particular case does not 
exist outside a person, and in fact could not do so. It is, in fact, the practical 
reason (or pure reason in its practical manifestation). It is the will for "the 
capacity for desire whose inner determining ground .. .lies within the subject's 
reason is called the will."204 The will is simply the subjects reason being 
practical. 
Pure reason, in its practical manifestation, is not subject to external 
coercion--nor internal coercion like the pursuit of happiness for that matter. 
It is a "form of a principle" which means it is both necessary and universal. 
Put in another way, it is not a particular maxim like "do unto others ... ," but 
the form of all particular maxims. It lies beneath them all as their ground 
and justification. It is therefore categorical. It is perhaps best exemplified by 
the statement "act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same 
time will that it should become a universal law."205 This is necessarily 
abstract for the purpose of being universal. It does not refer to any particular 
203Kant, Metaphysics of Morals p. 219-19 (emphasis in the original) 
204Kant, Metaphysics of Morals p. 213 
205Kant, Grounding for Metaphysics p. 30 
case or goal, but instead demands that before undertaking any action we 
consider whether this act would be justifiable on a universal standard. In 
other words, the real standard of behavior is that all our action may be 
justifiable by the mere form of universality in pure reason. 
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Universality is not a principle which can be touched or troubled by 
force, hope of reward, or anything else. It is not personal and does not vary 
from case to case. It cannot be legislated from without and thus the "general 
will" cannot shape it. This is so because the general will can only make laws 
dealing with individual problems or for specific goals. The principle of pure 
reason, however, is unconcerned with either. At best it may lie at the root of 
the laws designed by the general will, but it is not legislated by this means. It 
remains the form of a principle in crystalline purity in any rational creature. 
The distance between Kant and Rousseau is never greater than at this point. 
It is the distinctive element of Kant's moral philosophy which separates him 
from all previous moral theorists. 
Thus, in the end, we cannot define freedom in its being, and are unable 
to use reason itself to examine the nature of freedom or make statements 
about how and why it occurs. But we are able to offer as a tentative 
explanation of freedom that it is, in its practical extent, "rule by law." Once 
more this begs comparison with Rousseau. The two men vary widely on the 
nature of this "law," but both accept the necessity of law as a precondition for 
freedom (in a non-natural setting). But, even though there is a great deal of 
difference in the meaning of this "law" we must also recognize that Rousseau 
at least foreshadowed Kant's conclusion. Rousseau is not as clear on this 
point, and we are prevented from concluding that Kant "discovered" this 
notion in his reading of Rousseau, but he does suggest that the laws of the 
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state, to be equitable, must arise from the reason of man. It is clear that for 
Rousseau they cannot arise from any external source--like God or Nature--but 
must come from within the heart and mind of man. Still, in Rousseau, it is 
not completely clear that these laws can be said to arise in the minds of all 
men rather than that they are instilled in the hearts and minds of men 
through the "legislator." Ultimately, the Rousseauian perspective is that 
whatever was held by the general will was lawful and moral and that it was 
the duty of the individual to internalize the laws, mores and customs of the 
state. This is hardly a description of the transcendent law of reason which 
Kant would accept since and is far too contextual for his liking. He would 
accept as a "law" only what was necessary and universal. Thus, Kant's 
criticism of an empirical basis for action would here apply. Only those 
principles which could determine action before an empirical context can 
justifiable be described as a "law." 
CONCLUSION 
In the final analysis, I realize that I would have saved myself much of 
the early toil of trying to grasp the concept of freedom in the works of 
Rousseau and Kant if I had not been waylaid by terminology. I would never 
again attempt to write a similar work on "Freedom" in Kant and Rousseau, 
for the term 'freedom' is over-worked and in some fashion inapplicable to 
their work. I would approach Rousseau, in the future, in terms of political 
equality and Kant in terms of rational autonomy. 
Rousseau is simply too concerned with social harmony to treat as one 
interested in freedom. His emphasis on the "General will," on community, 
and on concession all tell against freedom which must, at root, allow some 
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ground to individual nonconformity. But, nonconformity is the last thing 
Rousseau is willing to concede to in his social order. His fear of social 
divisiveness is just too strong to allow for a multiplicity of opinions. 
Without at least the potential for this multiplicity in society how can we 
speak of "freedom"? We can see that absolute freedom is an unattainable 
goal. We can admit that social, economic, national and other factors all 
contribute to limiting the field of possible choices for any one individual at 
any given period of time. We can see that part of the goal of education is to 
create some sense of unity, community, cooperation and a certain "virtue" in 
impressionable youths. Indeed, when we train children in correct behavior 
we are in fact not far from Rousseau's idea of building a proper society. But 
the difference is that we usually end such extreme paternalism in 
adolescence, while Rousseau would maintain it through all the years of his 
republicans. Indeed, Rousseau's citizens often seem little more than large, 
overgrown children (with their parades, festivities and the like) in the 
shadow of the protective, if censorious and stern, father. It would be 
interested to examine Rousseau's statements about his own father and early 
home life as a means of better understanding the genesis of his political 
ideals. 
There is in Rousseau a sense of "freedom," I do not argue against that. 
But it is the freedom from social inequality and all its negative results. 
Freedom "from" something in this negative sense does not guarantee a 
positive sense of freedom for something. That is, freedom from physical 
abuse does not imply that I am free. Such a sense of freedom may be 
guarantied to those interned in a prison. They will not be abused, but they are 
not able to simply leave either. Rousseau seems to reduce everyone to the 
96 
state in which they are equally imprisoned and then to declare this state 
"free" because no one is enjoying benefits not enjoyed by others. At some 
point it seems to me that there must be a willingness to accept the non-
conformist to a degree. At times in our history nonconformists have been 
deemed pariahs, the "lunatic fringe" or whatever: they may have been cast 
down the social ladder, expelled from good society etc., but never could we 
speak in Rousseauian terms of forcing them "to be free" by forcing them to 
conform. Quite to the contrary, in those periods where we have had sedition 
laws, "un-American trials" and the like, we have tended to view these times 
as examples of "trampling freedom underfoot." Yet, Rousseau's Republic 
would make such abuses seem tame. "Freedom" in his system must make 
way for social equality and harmony by rooting out all that does not share the 
mind of the "general will." 
Meanwhile, there is the confusion involved in Kant's notion of 
freedom. Kant had a better claim than Rousseau for the use of the term 
'freedom'. But even in Kant the term is used in a very unintuitive sense. 
Yet, at the root of Kant there is a strong belief in the moral freedom of the 
individual. This is one of Kant's richest contributions to the discussion of 
morals. In the Kantian system every individual is a free moral agent. There 
is no disparity of "gifts of grace." The Pope is no more of a free moral agent 
than is the lowliest parishioner, the king no more than his lowest subject, 
and the theologian and metaphysician no more of an authority on morality 
than the illiterate fisherman who sets out from port early each morning. In 
fact, in Kant, God himself is no more a moral authority than that same 
fisherman. One may be able to cast the conflict of moral choices in greater 
elegance and exactitude, but in the end the "ought" of the one is as true and 
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good as the "ought" of the other. There is a recognition of individual moral 
choice and "freedom" here which cannot be found in the works of Rousseau. 
Kant's "Doctrine of Right" in his Metaphysics of Morals squarely addresses 
Rousseau's "general will" and internalization of the laws of this will. Kant 
completely discounts this means of action as a basis for morality or freedom, 
and in this I believe he is exactly correct. Nothing I am forced to do, through 
fear or hope of reward, can count as a moral choice anymore than those acts 
which I do unintentionally and which work for good in spite of my intention. 
In the latter case they are accidental and in the former coercion. By definition 
then, morality and moral freedom is always, and intimately, personal and 
individual. 
We have not, on the basis of the above account, uncovered Kant "the 
libertine." Such a misinterpretation collides immediately with those 
elements in Kant which, while appearing to point to an easy-going relativity 
of morals, actually point in the very opposite direction. Kant's vision of the 
ideal society differs very little, on the exterior, from Rousseau's. In a society 
which truly held to Kant' view there would be the harmony so longed for by 
Rousseau. In Kant's view there is only one real form of a moral law which 
we all share. It can be expressed as the "categorical imperative," but this is 
nothing but the formulation of a principle unutterable. What it is in actuality 
we cannot say for it is hidden in the noumenal world, but its practical 
manifestations are observed. But the fact that there is a universal principle 
that we all share must give pause to those who would use the term 'freedom' 
in the intuitive sense. I am not arguing for a unrestricted freedom, but rather 
questioning a notion of freedom based upon a determining causality. True, it 
is not a physical causality, but it is determining none the less. Kant's 
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argument is that we are, by virtue of this moral law, free from the laws of 
science and nature. But the nature of our freedom is that, unlike animals and 
falling rocks, we are subject to one other law that they are not. We are free to 
obey this other law while they simply react in a "natural," hence amoral, 
manner. But, in the end it seems we have simply traded a set of laws for a 
law of reason. We are subject to a noumenal law which does not exist for 
phenomenal beings. We are free, by virtue of this law of reason, to obey it. 
We should not get the mistaken idea that our freedom extends to being able 
to disobey this rational, moral law. Anytime we do not exercise our freedom 
to obey the moral law we are not "choosing," but being led by inclination--
hence natural causality. We obey the law of reason or are enslaved to 
phenomenal causality. We thus have a one-sided choice. Our choice is 
limited to obedience. Anything else is simply an abdication of our freedom. 
Thus, it is a conditional freedom we enjoy. It, once more, can be seen as 
freedom "from" something. This time it is freedom from natural causality or 
scientific determinism. 
This criticism is far less damaging to Kant's case than was the objection 
to Rousseau. There is a real sense in which Kant can claim to validly use the 
term 'freedom' which we would be hard-put to find in Rousseau. Yet, it 
seems like "rational autonomy" would be a better choice of words in Kant 
than "freedom." I make this distinction because such a one-sided choice--the 
choice to obey--as that which we find in Kant steps somewhat short of what 
we usually mean by freedom. "Freedom" without at least the opportunity for 
disobedience is a strangely construed definition. But, once more, this is far 
less of a dilemma than Rousseau's concept of freedom. In Kant it is a matter 
of perspective. I can choose to set aside my inclinations, goals, hopes, wishes, 
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desires, experiences etc., and chose to step out of the phenomenal world of my 
experience into the pure light of reason to make a moral choice. In this sense 
I am free from the constrictions which bind every unrational being around 
me. I have "transcended" nature in the best sense of the word. But, seen 
from a slightly different perspective this seems less of a true accomplishment 
for I have exchanged one determining factor for another. This may guarantee 
a type of freedom which is significantly less than the one we would wish to 
believe we possess. But then, in the end, perhaps this is the best for which we 
could ever really hope. 
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